daca planul Dima-Sarko va fi implementat nu vad castiguri relative mari rusiei in aceasta aventura caucaziana, au incercat revisionism, au esuat so far, dar au intarit status quo folosind brutal hard power pe care l-au perceput ca increasingly unsustainble, insa in schimb primesc the opposite in cazul Georgiei, mai mare engagement Westului, US 1miliard package si asistenta militara, UE on the ground cu misiune autonoma, asistenta economica, IMF package for georgia, noul forum de consultari georgia nato si implicarea nato in reconstructia infrastructurii militare (radare, etc.), possible UE georgia free trade, vise facilitate. deci castigurile cele militare adica isi vor trage doua baze cu 3000 soldati fiecare si poate o statie de barci mici in Abhazia care nu poate inlocui Sevastopol oricum, sunt in continuare outweighted si nu stim pana cand de piederi economice, bursa a pierdut 40% in compatatie cu luna mai,
gazprom vaca de muls la buget a scazut capitalizare de la peste 300 mlrd la sub 200 mlrd in termen extrem scurt. sigur trebuie recunoscut ca razboiul a fost o circumstanta agravanta, cauzele sunt alte, criza financiara pe plan international, dar iarasi contrazice bravada ca "suntem gata sa facem fata...", ca ulterior sa constate impotenta, asa cum a facut-o azi
Medvedev, tradus in limbaj suburban declaratia lui de azi se traduce "SUA ne-au tras-o cu criza lor ipotecara", un outcry mai sincer din parte kremlinului nu am vazut de mult (economia merge mai prost mai multa tensiune intre Dimka si Vova, so far avem intre
Kudrin si Nabibulina ministrii blocului economic), continuare ca vom redresa situatia era mai mult pe bursa si cetateni dar cred in van. iar din pacate pt rusi incercarile de a imita CW de genul manevrelor militare cu venezuela in coasta sua, primesc raspunsuri ironice care si mai mult ridiculizeaza moscova, de genul celor de la
departametul de stat, cu privire la rezistenta navelor ruse si capacitatea de a acoperi distanta atat de mare si a mai particvipa dupa un efort la exercitiul militar. sa speram ca Piotr Velikii va face fata conditiilor dificile din atlantic si nu va fi nevoie de un remorcher american sa-l traga pana acasa din nou la reparatii unde a stat mai tot timp.
un pasaj dedicat rusiei dupa razboiul din georgia intr-un
interviu dat de fost ambasador us la nato in adminsitratia clinton: "What's going to happen as a result of Georgia?
Russia is the loser here. It is interesting that when Putin decided to push back, he did so at a remote region next to his own country. He did it in a place where no one really cared about in geopolitical terms, as opposed to human terms, democratic terms, and the like. It also took him four days. Why is Russia the loser? If you look back to when it happened, it happened at a time when the whole world recognized that China is an amazingly competent and powerful country. They produce more innovation in a week in China than they do in Russia in ten years. There's all this incredible space in eastern Siberia, bordered by 1.3 billion Chinese, that's being rapidly depopulated by Russians. Russia's losing population at a faster clip than any other country in the developed world, even faster than some of the European countries with low birth rates. And the Russians need the outside world.
Why?
If you look to Russian President Dmitri Medvedev, his five point speech of the other day, it's interesting. The first three points are, "We want to be part of the real world." One of them is, America can't run everything. We already knew that. He is underscoring the need to be part of the outside world. Of course the European Union underscored it, but Putin has gone much too far and does not understand exactly what he is doing, not just stirring up a hornet's nest in all the countries that used to belong to the Communist world but also leading people in the West to ask whether they can do business with this man. That involves investment, it involves creditworthiness, it involves the sanctity of Russian investments abroad, it involves cooperation with the European Union, and in fact the strongest thing that's been done so far is what the EU decided yesterday, to suspend meetings on the EU-Russia partnership program. What they've said is, "We're going to send a team to look, and we're going to judge whether the Russians are following the six points of the cease-fire agreement with French President Sarkozy, and decide whether it's worth having this EU-Russian summit on November 14." This is done without a lot of shrill talk, it's done outside of the context of the United States, with our campaign rhetoric and all the memories of the old relationship. The Europeans are getting it about right in the low-key way of saying, "If you want to be a partner in the outside world, and by God you need it, you can't behave like this." Putin therefore has to judge whether to throw away opportunities to be engaged in the outside world. Maybe Putin will make the wrong decision. At the moment, Russia is Saudia Arabia with trees. What I'm getting at is, if they want to play in the outside world, it's not like the old days when they had a choice. They don't have a choice. The last regime of the Soviet Union collapsed over the failure of having made that choice. Of getting outclassed. If Putin says, "Having my sphere of influence is more important than being involved in the outside world," then Russia's going to pay a huge price for it. On the other hand, if he says "We've made our point, people will show us more respect in the future. We're now going to show we can be positive members of the international community," then he will have shown some stewardship of Russia with the outside world. If he makes the wrong choice we can live with it. He needs us a lot more than the other way around."