tranzitia de putere in rusia ia amploare usor usor, dupa preluarea sefii partidului Edinaia Rossia, se intra in faza migratiei anticipate din adminsitratia prezidentiala spre guvern. astfel printr-un decret au fost create o serie de noi functii in aparatul guvernului, si s-a produs prima mutare potrivit actului normativ Peskov tipul zimbitor-englezo-fluent (vazut si la bucuresti la sommeu) a fost numit in functia de adjunctul sefului aparatului guvernului si purtatorul de cuvint premierului. arteleria grea Secin, Ivanov Co. cred ca urmeaza.
in Turkmenistan continua de-niazov-izarea, tara se intoarce la calendar grigorian si se planifica reducerea drastica a monumentelor inaltate mult-iubitului turkmenbashi si mamei sale. totul e ca trend-ul sa nu puna fundamentele Berdimuhamedizarii tarii, modificarile in legea fundamentala a tarii propuse de ultimul creaza premise pt asa ceva intr-o forma mai "iluminata". un blog interesant destinat exclusiv Turkmenistanului aici.
in rusia se vorbeste despre generatia Putin in sensul nou-nascutilor in aceasta perioada, in solutionarea problememi demografice in rusia se mizeaza pe abordarea mecanico-cantitativa, incurajam sa faca copii, insa nepermis de multi se nasca ca sa moara, potrivit statisticilor mortalitatea infantila in rusia ca media 10 la 1000, sunt regiuni in care se atinge 20 si mai mult la 1000. nu este pregatita nici infrastructura sa faca fata noului "val". in acelasi timp problema demografica tine inca de extinderea HIV/SIDA la cupluri heterosexuale tinere si speranta de viata redusa (conditionata de consumul de alcool, boli cardiovasculare) ambele contribuind la reducerea fortei de munca dispoinibile in rusia. un editorial bun de Nicholas Eberstadt in WSJ care se preocupa de aceasta problematica intensiv. concluzia sa care tine de statutul rusiei in lume:"If Russia is to arrive in the front ranks of 21st-century economies, the yawning health gap that separates Russians from the rest of Europe and all other industrialized democracies has to be closed. Nothing less than a protracted national struggle may be necessary to achieve this goal."
un clip cu explicatii tehnice despre incidentul in care fost implicat MIG29 in spatiul aerian georgian.
marți, 29 aprilie 2008
joi, 24 aprilie 2008
post-Soci, demonizarea Ucrainei, Rusia mlitara si Georgia
un editorial pt CSEEA - Bucureşti-Soci: o perspectivă tridimensională de la Moscova.
citeva clipuri scurte postate pe blogul lui Taras (political ukraine) despre cum sunt organizate in realitate demonstratii anti-NATO la Kiev, demonizarea Ucrainei in TV rusa (povestea cu papusa lui Hitler), si deja cunoscutul Markov in criza de isterie pe marginea subiectului NATO si candidaturii Ucrainei. ieri citeam pe undeva despre un draft de plan de retragere a flotei ruse din crimea prezentat de Ogrizko lui Lavrov. reactia mid-ului rus e prematur sa discutam acest subiect, trebuie sa ne focusam pe realizarea deplina a acordului cu privire la dislocarea flotei. sigur moscova ar dori ca acest subiect sa fie discutat abia incepand din 2017, atunci cand se vor invoca motive de genul dificultatile tehnice de retragere sau nu avem unde sa cazam militari, etc. - chestii invocate deseori in disputa cu georgia. kievul incearca sa actioneze preventiv constient de aceasta tactica si cu 10 ani inanite de a expira acordul sa negocieze graficul de retragere.
Pavel Felenghauer scrie despre felul in care Rusia contribuie la procesul de aderare a georgiei la nato, face analiza pe incidentul cu avionul spion, iar Goltz discuta despre criza demografica, recrutarea tinerilor in armata si dificultati in completarea unitatilor, masuri adoptate de executiv-legislatic pt a forta tineri in armata si modalitati de eschiva de la servicul militar obligatoriu.
despre preocuparea FSB pentru reflectarea "corecta" (accentul pus pe deciziile luate de conducerea tarii) a istoriei celui de-al II-lea WW de ciniasti rusi aici.
citeva clipuri scurte postate pe blogul lui Taras (political ukraine) despre cum sunt organizate in realitate demonstratii anti-NATO la Kiev, demonizarea Ucrainei in TV rusa (povestea cu papusa lui Hitler), si deja cunoscutul Markov in criza de isterie pe marginea subiectului NATO si candidaturii Ucrainei. ieri citeam pe undeva despre un draft de plan de retragere a flotei ruse din crimea prezentat de Ogrizko lui Lavrov. reactia mid-ului rus e prematur sa discutam acest subiect, trebuie sa ne focusam pe realizarea deplina a acordului cu privire la dislocarea flotei. sigur moscova ar dori ca acest subiect sa fie discutat abia incepand din 2017, atunci cand se vor invoca motive de genul dificultatile tehnice de retragere sau nu avem unde sa cazam militari, etc. - chestii invocate deseori in disputa cu georgia. kievul incearca sa actioneze preventiv constient de aceasta tactica si cu 10 ani inanite de a expira acordul sa negocieze graficul de retragere.
Pavel Felenghauer scrie despre felul in care Rusia contribuie la procesul de aderare a georgiei la nato, face analiza pe incidentul cu avionul spion, iar Goltz discuta despre criza demografica, recrutarea tinerilor in armata si dificultati in completarea unitatilor, masuri adoptate de executiv-legislatic pt a forta tineri in armata si modalitati de eschiva de la servicul militar obligatoriu.
despre preocuparea FSB pentru reflectarea "corecta" (accentul pus pe deciziile luate de conducerea tarii) a istoriei celui de-al II-lea WW de ciniasti rusi aici.
miercuri, 23 aprilie 2008
US-Russia, BSEC?, Russia-China, NATO future
un interviu cu Andrei Piontkovskii despre perspective relatiilor bilaterale ruso-americane dupa alegeri in Rusia si SUA. un articol din EMD in care autorul se intreaba daca BSEC-ul is doomed si se indreapta spre dead-end, analiza se face in lumina ultimului summit din Ucraina care detine presedentie in aceasta organizatie pana in 1 mai.
cam din 2004 se discuta intens cat de departe va merge parteneriatul sino-rus, well o relatare cu privire la cooperare sau mai degraba tensiuni in domeniul militar (industria de aparare) arata limitele acestui parteneriat dar si ca balanta gradual inclina in defavoarea rusiei, ceea ce logic ar declansa revizuirea continutului relatiei "priveligiate" cu Beijing pe termen mediu si lung, daca se va intimpla asa ceva sau se va merge din inertie pe ideea veche e o noua intrebare pt adminsitratia Medvedev. si un articol de Ronald Asmus pe viitorul NATO si necesitatea regandirii parteneriatelor.
cam din 2004 se discuta intens cat de departe va merge parteneriatul sino-rus, well o relatare cu privire la cooperare sau mai degraba tensiuni in domeniul militar (industria de aparare) arata limitele acestui parteneriat dar si ca balanta gradual inclina in defavoarea rusiei, ceea ce logic ar declansa revizuirea continutului relatiei "priveligiate" cu Beijing pe termen mediu si lung, daca se va intimpla asa ceva sau se va merge din inertie pe ideea veche e o noua intrebare pt adminsitratia Medvedev. si un articol de Ronald Asmus pe viitorul NATO si necesitatea regandirii parteneriatelor.
marți, 22 aprilie 2008
Marile puteri frustrate si recognition game (Rusia)
un articol f fine in recentul numar International Relations de Shogo Suzuki intitulat Seeking legitimate Great Power status in postCW International society: China's and Japan's participation in UNPKO. combina cu succes elemente din scoala engleza RI, realism si constructivism.
ce face autorul? defineste de la inceput marile puteri legitime in asa zisa societatea internationla, actori a caror superioritate este recunoscuta de puteri minore, din acest statut deriva o serie de privelegii, drepturi si obligatii in vederea mentinerii si implementarea normelor societatii initernationale. dupa face incadrare a marilor puteri frustrate, cele care considera ca au fost refuzate in egalitate sociala in raporturile cu marile puteri legitime, care nu se bucura de privilegii care rezulta din acest statut si care percep o discordanta intre propriiile asteptari si drepturi de care se bucura in cadrul societatii internationale. pentru a capata statutul puterile frustrate initiaza recognition game (se inspira din Erik Ringmar, The recognition game: Soviet Russia against the West, 2002) prin definirea identitatii de mare putere (se comporta ca atare) si convingerea ca merita acest statut. In continuare luand drept exemplu China si Japonia el arata cum aceastea in postCW prin intermediul operatiunilor de mentinere a pacii a ONU au incercat sa "smulga" statutul de membru responsabil si legitimate great power. rostul demonstratiei de a arata ca puterile frustrate nu neaparat challenge status quo ci mai degraba se manifesta ca principalii sustinatori a normelor care guverneaza societatea internationala.
articolul e intersant si din alt punct de vedere, e o putere frustrata si linga noi care numai si joaca reprize de recognition game: incearca sa intre in cele mai importante si exclusiviste institutii (OMC, OECD), sa aiba o relatie privelegiata cu altele (NATO, EU), isi aroga un rol special regional (CSI), pozeaza drept intermediar cinstit (conferinta pt pace in ME la Moscova), etc. daca privim din aceasta perspectiva Bucuresti-Soci, pt moscova a fost un alt episod din recognition game, ce a spus Putin fara noi nu este posibil............e un fel arogant de a smulge recunoastere, declaratia de la soci ce spune importanta rusiei in contra-terorism, nuclear si energy. spre deosebire de chinezi si japonezi, rusii o fac mai galagios dar nu tocmai de pe pozitii materiale solide.
ce face autorul? defineste de la inceput marile puteri legitime in asa zisa societatea internationla, actori a caror superioritate este recunoscuta de puteri minore, din acest statut deriva o serie de privelegii, drepturi si obligatii in vederea mentinerii si implementarea normelor societatii initernationale. dupa face incadrare a marilor puteri frustrate, cele care considera ca au fost refuzate in egalitate sociala in raporturile cu marile puteri legitime, care nu se bucura de privilegii care rezulta din acest statut si care percep o discordanta intre propriiile asteptari si drepturi de care se bucura in cadrul societatii internationale. pentru a capata statutul puterile frustrate initiaza recognition game (se inspira din Erik Ringmar, The recognition game: Soviet Russia against the West, 2002) prin definirea identitatii de mare putere (se comporta ca atare) si convingerea ca merita acest statut. In continuare luand drept exemplu China si Japonia el arata cum aceastea in postCW prin intermediul operatiunilor de mentinere a pacii a ONU au incercat sa "smulga" statutul de membru responsabil si legitimate great power. rostul demonstratiei de a arata ca puterile frustrate nu neaparat challenge status quo ci mai degraba se manifesta ca principalii sustinatori a normelor care guverneaza societatea internationala.
articolul e intersant si din alt punct de vedere, e o putere frustrata si linga noi care numai si joaca reprize de recognition game: incearca sa intre in cele mai importante si exclusiviste institutii (OMC, OECD), sa aiba o relatie privelegiata cu altele (NATO, EU), isi aroga un rol special regional (CSI), pozeaza drept intermediar cinstit (conferinta pt pace in ME la Moscova), etc. daca privim din aceasta perspectiva Bucuresti-Soci, pt moscova a fost un alt episod din recognition game, ce a spus Putin fara noi nu este posibil............e un fel arogant de a smulge recunoastere, declaratia de la soci ce spune importanta rusiei in contra-terorism, nuclear si energy. spre deosebire de chinezi si japonezi, rusii o fac mai galagios dar nu tocmai de pe pozitii materiale solide.
luni, 21 aprilie 2008
South Stream-Serbia?, pod intre EU si Asia, Rusia/OMC
a mai scris ca Rusia intimplina dificultati cu obtinerea ratificarii acordului pe South Stream semnat cu Serbia de parlamentul de la Belgrad. asa cum rezulta din informatii de aici si aici, kremlinul a cam panicat detasind in serbia pe Soigu (faptul ca Sereja conduce ministerul pentru situatii exceptionale confirma cat de urgenta si serioasa este treaba), ultimul a semnat un protocol ridicol cu privire la necesitatea raificarii intelegerii, care in realitate are putine sanse sa fie aprobata, in guvern nu exista consens asupra acestei probleme prin urmare proiectul de lege nu poate fi aprobat, iar parlamentul care ar trebui sa ratifice acordul a fost dizolvat serbia avand alegeri parlamentare anticipate in mai. cam asa se intimpla cand se face o chestiune serioasa la graba si suntem abia in faza incipienta. multa lume a spus ca rusia decat sa faca planuri cincinale in constructia de conducte ar face bine sa dezvolte capacitati de LNG, cu atat mai mult ca cei mai mari consuamtori isi dezvolta infrastructura pt a importa si descarca LNG, de exmplu despre planurile impresionante a chinei cu harta care indica terminale LNG aici.
multa lume la moscova abereaza pe subiectul rusia podul de transport intre Europa si Asia. intr-un editorial semnat de Inozemtsev, autorul se intreba cine pentru cine serveste drept pod si explica cat se poate de convingator cu date statistice ca Europa de fapt este un pod maritim pentru Rusia care face legatura cu Asia.
continua saga aderarii la OMC de 14 ani a rusiei, s-a semnat protocolul cu Emiratele Arabe Unite, ramane Arabia Saudita si Georgia tocmai cea care a primit cadou recent de la Moscova sub forma intensificarii legaturilor cu enclavele separatiste, tbilisi sigur este predispus la negocieri. nu trebuie sa uitam si de engocieri multilaterale, in ultima perioada nu prea am auzit progrese.
Sveta Gamova de la NG scoate tot ce are mai bun in calitatile sale de reporter-"analist" pentru a deconspira "complotul" Romaniei impotriva Ucrainei si Moldovei. tipa inventeaza niste combinatii la care Stalin doar putea visa. anyway toate acestea nu inseamna ca ar strica o anumita prudenta in declaratii publice tocmai pentru a nu oferi astfel de ocazii de a lovi gratuit.
multa lume la moscova abereaza pe subiectul rusia podul de transport intre Europa si Asia. intr-un editorial semnat de Inozemtsev, autorul se intreba cine pentru cine serveste drept pod si explica cat se poate de convingator cu date statistice ca Europa de fapt este un pod maritim pentru Rusia care face legatura cu Asia.
continua saga aderarii la OMC de 14 ani a rusiei, s-a semnat protocolul cu Emiratele Arabe Unite, ramane Arabia Saudita si Georgia tocmai cea care a primit cadou recent de la Moscova sub forma intensificarii legaturilor cu enclavele separatiste, tbilisi sigur este predispus la negocieri. nu trebuie sa uitam si de engocieri multilaterale, in ultima perioada nu prea am auzit progrese.
Sveta Gamova de la NG scoate tot ce are mai bun in calitatile sale de reporter-"analist" pentru a deconspira "complotul" Romaniei impotriva Ucrainei si Moldovei. tipa inventeaza niste combinatii la care Stalin doar putea visa. anyway toate acestea nu inseamna ca ar strica o anumita prudenta in declaratii publice tocmai pentru a nu oferi astfel de ocazii de a lovi gratuit.
joi, 17 aprilie 2008
New Cold War? Russia-West (Sakwa)
l-am citit pe Sakwa, articolul din ultimul numar International Affairs intitulat New Cold War or 20 years crisis? (aluzia la opera lui E.H.Carr) Russia and international politics. dupa lectura mix feelings. de ce? voi incerca sa sintetizez.
ce face Sakwa? detaliaza de la inceput paragraful din cartea sa privitor la noul realism, contradictiile sale si faramitarea acestuia in al doilea mandat a lui Putin. autorul foarte mult se inspira din Lo, Trenin si Tsygankov. el prezinta obiectivul de baza a noului realism de a realiza o balanta (imposibila) intre autonomie si integrare, adica suntem inside dar in acelasi timp si outside, ne integram in termeni proprii, ne integram in baza conditiilor definite de noi. in opinia sa aceasta contradictie a contribuit la insucsesul acestuia, al doilea factor este incapacitatea occidentului to devise o abordare care sa depaseasca mostenirea CW si sa inteleaga Rusia, si anume aceasta neintelegere a Rusiei a dus la speechul plin de frustrare la Munich si potrivit lui Sakwa reactia defensiva in CSI (asta depinde de unde privesti).
in continuare el se intreaba de ce desi CW s-a incheiat acu 20 de ani in urma, structura ideatica, cu tot cu retorica tipica CW a reaparut in relatiile dintre rusia si occident? sunt identificate 4 failures in politici de adaptare la noul mediu, de natura politica, strategica, culturala si intelectuala, care au condus la aceasta stare de fapt.
- politic, pastrarea sturcturilor CW in timp ce altele au disparut (se refera la NATO, desi omite natura celor doua aliante, Varsovia impusa si disparuta odata cu retragerea hegemonului, a doua formata prin consens, SUA actor preponderent dar nu cu puteri absolute de decizie), si lipsa unui organism inclusive, cum au militat rusii pt OSCE (acolo avea dr.de veto, dar altceva sunt curios cum ar reactiona OSCE in calitate de organizatie de securitate in Yugoslavia?), adica problema integrarii fostului rival in sistem ca acesta sa nu mai repete isparava de a provoca neplaceri din nou, in opinia lui Sakwa nu a fost rezolvata.
- strategic, noua era nucleara provocata in opinia sa mainly de SUA asa cum reulta din expunere, retragere din AMB, scutul, refuzul de a prelungi START-I, refuzul de face scut comun etc (cred ca e o prezentare unilaterala si prea mult se pune in carca SUA). si reactia rusiei cu startegic bombers, asa aduga pe logica asta reorientarea rachetelor spre POlonia si daca va fi nevoie asupra Ucrainei (ultima fiind chiar o tampenie, ca oricum nu vei trage, de ce mai tintesti), nu prea sunt de acord cu Sakwa, reactia rusiei a demonstrat incapabilitatea de a depasi nuclear age din CW si a privi inovativ asupra realitatii din jur. el continua cu strategic failures, si spune ca extinderea NATO a fost una, se omite a spuen ca tocmai presiunile rusilor au facut ca esticii sa doreasca membership, numai insistentele personale a lui Clinton au facut ca rusii sa se retraga din tarile baltice militar, poveste cu Georgia e aceeasi, pana nu au putut face rotatia (neavind vize de intrare de la Tbilisi nu s-au apucat de retragere). mai sunt inca citeva esecuri, CFE si energy politics in care dupa mine rusia a excelat si a facut tot posibil perpetuind logica of great game.
- intelectual, se critica conceptul SUA de 'transformational diplomacy" si prijinul pt GUAM, deoarece este potrivit autorului astonishingly impotriva Rusiei, nu prea se prezinta failure intelectual de partea rusa.
- cultural, problema Rusa pt occident si 300 de ani de existenta uneasy, in anii 90 si 2000 se considera ca s-a ratat o noua ocazie.
nu pot sa nu mentionez pasajul cu influenta toxica a liderilor din CSI (Georgia sau Ucraina aduse ca exemple) asupra politicii SUA, sincer nu cred ca washingtonul elaboreaza politica sa dupa ce spun cei de la Kiev sau Tbilisi in vizita sa scurta la Casa Alba, in ciuda lobby puternic armean (pe care georgienii sau ucrainenii nu au pe linga capitoliu), SUA au adoptat programul de asistenta cu Azerbaijan in 2002.
in final, asa cum reiesa din prezentare punctelor cheie, se creeaza imaginea ca se face o enumerare a esecurilor occidentului, rusia primind doar o carcaterizare ca noul realism este contradictoriu si in rusia sunt citeva derapaje democratice dar asta nu poate fi un temei pt critici si politica pe care a avut occidentul fata de rusia in mandatul lui Putin. concluzia imediata dupa lectura: rusia nu a fost inteleasa corect. ma intreb oare rusii au inteles ce se intimpla cu tara lor, aveau consens catre ce evolueaza, si mai mult au prezentat o viziune coerenta publicului in exterior. explicatia cu occidentul neintelegator este foarte convenabila, dar nu prea ne ajuta sa intelegem really de ce totusi relatiile s-au deteriorat si au reparut elemete retorice de CW.
ce face Sakwa? detaliaza de la inceput paragraful din cartea sa privitor la noul realism, contradictiile sale si faramitarea acestuia in al doilea mandat a lui Putin. autorul foarte mult se inspira din Lo, Trenin si Tsygankov. el prezinta obiectivul de baza a noului realism de a realiza o balanta (imposibila) intre autonomie si integrare, adica suntem inside dar in acelasi timp si outside, ne integram in termeni proprii, ne integram in baza conditiilor definite de noi. in opinia sa aceasta contradictie a contribuit la insucsesul acestuia, al doilea factor este incapacitatea occidentului to devise o abordare care sa depaseasca mostenirea CW si sa inteleaga Rusia, si anume aceasta neintelegere a Rusiei a dus la speechul plin de frustrare la Munich si potrivit lui Sakwa reactia defensiva in CSI (asta depinde de unde privesti).
in continuare el se intreaba de ce desi CW s-a incheiat acu 20 de ani in urma, structura ideatica, cu tot cu retorica tipica CW a reaparut in relatiile dintre rusia si occident? sunt identificate 4 failures in politici de adaptare la noul mediu, de natura politica, strategica, culturala si intelectuala, care au condus la aceasta stare de fapt.
- politic, pastrarea sturcturilor CW in timp ce altele au disparut (se refera la NATO, desi omite natura celor doua aliante, Varsovia impusa si disparuta odata cu retragerea hegemonului, a doua formata prin consens, SUA actor preponderent dar nu cu puteri absolute de decizie), si lipsa unui organism inclusive, cum au militat rusii pt OSCE (acolo avea dr.de veto, dar altceva sunt curios cum ar reactiona OSCE in calitate de organizatie de securitate in Yugoslavia?), adica problema integrarii fostului rival in sistem ca acesta sa nu mai repete isparava de a provoca neplaceri din nou, in opinia lui Sakwa nu a fost rezolvata.
- strategic, noua era nucleara provocata in opinia sa mainly de SUA asa cum reulta din expunere, retragere din AMB, scutul, refuzul de a prelungi START-I, refuzul de face scut comun etc (cred ca e o prezentare unilaterala si prea mult se pune in carca SUA). si reactia rusiei cu startegic bombers, asa aduga pe logica asta reorientarea rachetelor spre POlonia si daca va fi nevoie asupra Ucrainei (ultima fiind chiar o tampenie, ca oricum nu vei trage, de ce mai tintesti), nu prea sunt de acord cu Sakwa, reactia rusiei a demonstrat incapabilitatea de a depasi nuclear age din CW si a privi inovativ asupra realitatii din jur. el continua cu strategic failures, si spune ca extinderea NATO a fost una, se omite a spuen ca tocmai presiunile rusilor au facut ca esticii sa doreasca membership, numai insistentele personale a lui Clinton au facut ca rusii sa se retraga din tarile baltice militar, poveste cu Georgia e aceeasi, pana nu au putut face rotatia (neavind vize de intrare de la Tbilisi nu s-au apucat de retragere). mai sunt inca citeva esecuri, CFE si energy politics in care dupa mine rusia a excelat si a facut tot posibil perpetuind logica of great game.
- intelectual, se critica conceptul SUA de 'transformational diplomacy" si prijinul pt GUAM, deoarece este potrivit autorului astonishingly impotriva Rusiei, nu prea se prezinta failure intelectual de partea rusa.
- cultural, problema Rusa pt occident si 300 de ani de existenta uneasy, in anii 90 si 2000 se considera ca s-a ratat o noua ocazie.
nu pot sa nu mentionez pasajul cu influenta toxica a liderilor din CSI (Georgia sau Ucraina aduse ca exemple) asupra politicii SUA, sincer nu cred ca washingtonul elaboreaza politica sa dupa ce spun cei de la Kiev sau Tbilisi in vizita sa scurta la Casa Alba, in ciuda lobby puternic armean (pe care georgienii sau ucrainenii nu au pe linga capitoliu), SUA au adoptat programul de asistenta cu Azerbaijan in 2002.
in final, asa cum reiesa din prezentare punctelor cheie, se creeaza imaginea ca se face o enumerare a esecurilor occidentului, rusia primind doar o carcaterizare ca noul realism este contradictoriu si in rusia sunt citeva derapaje democratice dar asta nu poate fi un temei pt critici si politica pe care a avut occidentul fata de rusia in mandatul lui Putin. concluzia imediata dupa lectura: rusia nu a fost inteleasa corect. ma intreb oare rusii au inteles ce se intimpla cu tara lor, aveau consens catre ce evolueaza, si mai mult au prezentat o viziune coerenta publicului in exterior. explicatia cu occidentul neintelegator este foarte convenabila, dar nu prea ne ajuta sa intelegem really de ce totusi relatiile s-au deteriorat si au reparut elemete retorice de CW.
miercuri, 16 aprilie 2008
Ucraina in NATO (again), Edinstvo, Rusia-Serbia
subiectul Ucraina in Nato si "raspunsul" Rusiei e inca pe val. aici video cu emisiunea k barieru, Soloviov a depasit orice limite, impresia mea ca nu mai e moderator si clar partinitor cel putin in aceasta dezbatere, remarcile sale sunt foarte ieftine. un op-ed despre dificultatea constructiei identitare in Ucraina si preconditiile pt succesul acestei intreprnderi. o rememorare a lui Dorenko foarte cinica si cu multe amanunte picante despre cum s-a format Edinstvo precursorul Edinaya Rossya a carei secretar general va fi Putin. chiar si functia aduce aminte de URSS, asa cum il citeaza cei de la newtimes pe Chernomirdin: "orice organizatie am crea, tot Partidul Comunist ne iesa". si ultimul numar din russian analytical digest pe relatiile ruso-sirbesti aici.
marți, 15 aprilie 2008
Ucraina in NATO si Rusia, Nabucco is not dead (II)
ieri am abordat un subiect care aprinde tot mai multe pasiuni in Rusia, dar din toate aceste dezbateri se aud si voci intelepte. iata o relatare despre o masa rotunda organizata de cindva influentul think-tank Sovet po Vnesheni i Oboronnoi Politiki (SVOP) care a adunat la un loc deputati, experti si militari pt a dezbate concluziile ultimului summit NATO si in special extinderea organizatiei. este de remarcat opinia unui general care a observat ca militar extinderea aliantei nu reprezinta amenintare pt Rusia, si pentru a reduce handicapul fata de Occident ar fi bine de avea o relatie de cooperare sanatoasa. inca ceva mi-a placut raspunsul amar a unui participant la intrebarea ce va face Rusia daca Ucraina va adera la NATO, ceea ce a spus Stalin cand a aflat ca maresalul Rokossovskii sotia pt o doamna mai tanara "il vom invidia".
dezbaterea continua si in NG, un editorial foarte bun, principala observatie este ca rusia repeta aceleasi greseli in cazul Georgiei si Ucrainei pe care le-a facut cu tarile baltice cand acestea urmareau integrarea euroatlantica. se aduce si interviul ministrului de externe leton care confirma ca atunci cand au fost presati de rusia isi dublau eforturile in vederea aderarii. si in final relatiile intre rusia si balticii au fost stricate pt ceva timp, iar ultimii tot au ajuns unde isi doreau.
si inca ceva, Nabucco primeste un boost, informatii aici, aici si aici, asa cum rezulta din declaratiile Benita Ferrero-Waldner in urma intilnirii cu Berdimuhamedov, EU a ajuns la o intelegere cu Turkmenistanul pt 10 mld cubi de gaze, deci usor usor se rezolva baza materiala, adica surse pt conducta, se face si pentru a linisti prietenii de la Moscova preocupati ca cineva sapa degeaba transee. se profileaza negocieri si intelegeri similare cu Kazahstan si Uzbekistan. se pare ca am avut dreptate, Nabucco is not dead. iata si speechul recent comisarului Ferrero-Waldner pe perspectivele in raporturile UE cu Rusia.
dezbaterea continua si in NG, un editorial foarte bun, principala observatie este ca rusia repeta aceleasi greseli in cazul Georgiei si Ucrainei pe care le-a facut cu tarile baltice cand acestea urmareau integrarea euroatlantica. se aduce si interviul ministrului de externe leton care confirma ca atunci cand au fost presati de rusia isi dublau eforturile in vederea aderarii. si in final relatiile intre rusia si balticii au fost stricate pt ceva timp, iar ultimii tot au ajuns unde isi doreau.
si inca ceva, Nabucco primeste un boost, informatii aici, aici si aici, asa cum rezulta din declaratiile Benita Ferrero-Waldner in urma intilnirii cu Berdimuhamedov, EU a ajuns la o intelegere cu Turkmenistanul pt 10 mld cubi de gaze, deci usor usor se rezolva baza materiala, adica surse pt conducta, se face si pentru a linisti prietenii de la Moscova preocupati ca cineva sapa degeaba transee. se profileaza negocieri si intelegeri similare cu Kazahstan si Uzbekistan. se pare ca am avut dreptate, Nabucco is not dead. iata si speechul recent comisarului Ferrero-Waldner pe perspectivele in raporturile UE cu Rusia.
luni, 14 aprilie 2008
Rusia si promovarea separatismului in Ucraina: how far?
poveste cu "declaratia" lui Putin la Bucuresti in privinta statalitatii Ucrainei continua, cel putin ne-am lamurit ca in aparitiile sale publice la Bucuresti nu a declarat asa ceva asa cum au prezentat unele surse mass media din romania. the economist reproduce un dialog care ar fi avut loc intre Bush si Putin si ultimul ar fi spus:“Do you understand, George, that Ukraine is not even a state.” Claiming that most of Ukraine's territory was “given away” by Russia, Mr Putin supposedly also said that if the country joined NATO it would “cease to exist”. am dubii ca Putin ar fi zis asa ceva pe doua motive, informatia a ajuns in presa pe filiera rusa (potrivit regulilor manipularii Peskov spoksman presedintelui a zis ca nu a auzit asa ceva) si ar putea fi o scurgere intentionata sa demonstreze cat de tought a vorbit Putin la NRC, si nu avem confirmare de la alte delegatii sau participanti, cum am avut de exemplu informatii despre discutii dure pe Georgia si Ukraina si confirmare de la MFA Cehiei. si o astfel de declaratie nu se inscria in contextul, Duma pe post de barkingdog a facut un atac preventiv asupra Ucrainei in sedinta sa plenara (mesajul a fost trimis), iar Putin urma sa se intilneasca cu Bush la Sochi, deci it doesnt make sense to be so cocky.
povestea nu se incheie aici, presupusul dialog a fost dezvoltat in analize speculative cum rusia ar putea diviza ucraina si cum o va face (violenta, posibil razboi civil, anexarea, etc.) daca isi va retrage obligatiile rezultate din declaratia Clinton-Eltin-Kravciuk si tratatul de prietenie ruso-ucrainian. fara indoiala rusia si numerosi actori care participa daca nu la formularea atunci cel putin la implementarea strategiilor vor intensifica retorica separatista (Est/Vest plus Crimeea), intrebarea este cit de departe sunt dispusi sa mearga daca pesupunem ca se judeca prin prisma relatiei cost-beneficiu. personal cred ca rusia nu se va aventura in actiuni de natura violenta si vor fi extrem de atenti sa nu alieneze fortele politice proruse (partia regionov a lui Yanukovici), care nici intrun caz nu doresc divizarea tarii si nici sa fie o republica vasala in cadrul unei uniunii politice intre Rusia si Ucraina. confirmare cu date faptice vine de la Taras Kuzio care a publicat pe blogul sau:"In the same year that Viktor Yanukovych first became prime minister (2002) Ukraine officially declared its intention to seek NATO membership. The Yanukovych government, in power until the end of 2004, and the Party of Regions never rejected the official goal of NATO membership.It was also the first Yanukovych government that put Ukraine on the path to a NATO MAP. The Yanukovych government implemented the first two annual NATO-Ukraine Action Plans in 2003-2004."
in continuare nu cred ca rusia va merge mai departe de retorica si sprjinul pt Yanukovici, deoarece o destabilizare a Ucrainei pune in pericol tranzitul gazelor spre Europa principalul sau client care umple pusculita bugetara a Moscovei. tot aici se poate spune ca Ucraina este un actor militar potent, care in eventualitatea unui conflcit militar poate sa ofere un raspuns dureros. una e sa generez si sa gestionez instabilitatea controlata in Gerogia si Moldova la inceputul anilor 90 si alta sa provoci Ucraina si intrun context international extrem de diferit. impactul unei astfel de decizii ar fi dezastruos pentru pozitiile rusiei in csi. nu cred ca rusia va face fata militar, dar nu vor fi atat de blind incat sa declanseze un conflict pe flancul vestic, in timp ce au probleme grave pe flancul sudic (cauzaul de nord unde se concentreaza forte conventioanle importante, asia centrala afgansitan) si potential estic. si in final elita rusa este f pragmatica, nu vor risca o confruntare deschisa, in incercarea de a instala replica jalnica a zidului de fier undeva in ucraina, care ar putea provoca occidentul (ex. blocarea contrurilor, limitarea circulatiei in spatiul euroatlantic a oficialilor implicati, alte sanctiuni, etc.) si deteriora pe termen lung relatiile cu vestul.
deci, sa ascultam atent moscova si sa facem propriile calcule care arata ca rusia va incerca sa deraieze Ucraina de pe terasamentul euroatlantic, dar trebuie sa fim constienti pina unde sunt dispusi sa mearga ca sa le neutralizam eforturile.
povestea nu se incheie aici, presupusul dialog a fost dezvoltat in analize speculative cum rusia ar putea diviza ucraina si cum o va face (violenta, posibil razboi civil, anexarea, etc.) daca isi va retrage obligatiile rezultate din declaratia Clinton-Eltin-Kravciuk si tratatul de prietenie ruso-ucrainian. fara indoiala rusia si numerosi actori care participa daca nu la formularea atunci cel putin la implementarea strategiilor vor intensifica retorica separatista (Est/Vest plus Crimeea), intrebarea este cit de departe sunt dispusi sa mearga daca pesupunem ca se judeca prin prisma relatiei cost-beneficiu. personal cred ca rusia nu se va aventura in actiuni de natura violenta si vor fi extrem de atenti sa nu alieneze fortele politice proruse (partia regionov a lui Yanukovici), care nici intrun caz nu doresc divizarea tarii si nici sa fie o republica vasala in cadrul unei uniunii politice intre Rusia si Ucraina. confirmare cu date faptice vine de la Taras Kuzio care a publicat pe blogul sau:"In the same year that Viktor Yanukovych first became prime minister (2002) Ukraine officially declared its intention to seek NATO membership. The Yanukovych government, in power until the end of 2004, and the Party of Regions never rejected the official goal of NATO membership.It was also the first Yanukovych government that put Ukraine on the path to a NATO MAP. The Yanukovych government implemented the first two annual NATO-Ukraine Action Plans in 2003-2004."
in continuare nu cred ca rusia va merge mai departe de retorica si sprjinul pt Yanukovici, deoarece o destabilizare a Ucrainei pune in pericol tranzitul gazelor spre Europa principalul sau client care umple pusculita bugetara a Moscovei. tot aici se poate spune ca Ucraina este un actor militar potent, care in eventualitatea unui conflcit militar poate sa ofere un raspuns dureros. una e sa generez si sa gestionez instabilitatea controlata in Gerogia si Moldova la inceputul anilor 90 si alta sa provoci Ucraina si intrun context international extrem de diferit. impactul unei astfel de decizii ar fi dezastruos pentru pozitiile rusiei in csi. nu cred ca rusia va face fata militar, dar nu vor fi atat de blind incat sa declanseze un conflict pe flancul vestic, in timp ce au probleme grave pe flancul sudic (cauzaul de nord unde se concentreaza forte conventioanle importante, asia centrala afgansitan) si potential estic. si in final elita rusa este f pragmatica, nu vor risca o confruntare deschisa, in incercarea de a instala replica jalnica a zidului de fier undeva in ucraina, care ar putea provoca occidentul (ex. blocarea contrurilor, limitarea circulatiei in spatiul euroatlantic a oficialilor implicati, alte sanctiuni, etc.) si deteriora pe termen lung relatiile cu vestul.
deci, sa ascultam atent moscova si sa facem propriile calcule care arata ca rusia va incerca sa deraieze Ucraina de pe terasamentul euroatlantic, dar trebuie sa fim constienti pina unde sunt dispusi sa mearga ca sa le neutralizam eforturile.
joi, 10 aprilie 2008
Gaidar vs Illarionov (II), Rusia militara (VI)
a mai scris despre disputa mainly pe paginele Vedomosti intre Gaidar si Illarionov, se pare ca participantii nu au epuizat toate argumentele, un nou raspuns a lui Illarionov aici.
este deja o cutuma printre putinofili la fiecare ocazie de a remarca realizarile administratiei in domeniul militar, declansarea procesului de profesionalizare armatei, adoptarea programului de inarmare, organizarea de exercitii militare, dezvoltarea armamentului de noua generatie, etc. toate asa cum se concluzioneaza datorita cresterii spectaculoase a bugetului. well, desi realizarilor deseori anuntate se poat aduce mai multe contrargumente, cred ca cea mai mare atentie merita felul in care se cheltuie banii, caci canitatea nu garanteaza si calitatea. iata si informatia oferita de Curtea de Conturi care in urma controlului pe 2006-07 a constat ca 70% din sumele cheltuite cu incalcarea legii privind bugetul au fost facute de ministerului apararii, in acelasi timp experti independenti afirma ca proprtiile sunt mult mai mari, curtea idetificand doar cazurile extrem de evidente. deci putem afirma fara dubii ca cresterea bugetului militar a contribuit in mod substantial la bunastarea personala a multor generali/functionari MApN din Rusia, nu pot sa nu fiu de acord aici cu opinia unei persoane avizate ca adevarata reforma a armatei ruse si prin urmare o armata eficienta este imposibila fara un stat eficient.
este deja o cutuma printre putinofili la fiecare ocazie de a remarca realizarile administratiei in domeniul militar, declansarea procesului de profesionalizare armatei, adoptarea programului de inarmare, organizarea de exercitii militare, dezvoltarea armamentului de noua generatie, etc. toate asa cum se concluzioneaza datorita cresterii spectaculoase a bugetului. well, desi realizarilor deseori anuntate se poat aduce mai multe contrargumente, cred ca cea mai mare atentie merita felul in care se cheltuie banii, caci canitatea nu garanteaza si calitatea. iata si informatia oferita de Curtea de Conturi care in urma controlului pe 2006-07 a constat ca 70% din sumele cheltuite cu incalcarea legii privind bugetul au fost facute de ministerului apararii, in acelasi timp experti independenti afirma ca proprtiile sunt mult mai mari, curtea idetificand doar cazurile extrem de evidente. deci putem afirma fara dubii ca cresterea bugetului militar a contribuit in mod substantial la bunastarea personala a multor generali/functionari MApN din Rusia, nu pot sa nu fiu de acord aici cu opinia unei persoane avizate ca adevarata reforma a armatei ruse si prin urmare o armata eficienta este imposibila fara un stat eficient.
Putin pregateste teren la guvern, referendum interzis
asa cum au anticipat expertii imediat dupa scrutinul din 2 martie (si eu intr-un oped) povestea formalizarii, redistribuirii responsabilitatilor, competentelor in relatia intre presedinte si premier era inevitabila dat fiind ambitiile prim-ministrului Putin. informatia potrivit careia institutia reprezentantului presedintelui in regiuni va fi subordonata dupa instalarea lui Putin la Casa Alba noului premier confirma aceasta ipoteza, toate acestea se leaga si de reforma regionala gandit de Kozak.
faptul ca Casa Alba se pregateste sa gazduiasca pe noul premier se confirma si prin noul regim in comunicare cu mas media, o noua abordare a fost calificata de reporteri drept "marca inregistrata a Kremlinului". potrivit noilor reglementari accesul libera reprezentantilor presei acreditati pe linga guvern este interzis. comunicare intre mass media si guvern se va realiza de acum incolo in cadrul conferintelor saptaminale dupa sedintele executivului, activitatilor protocolare cu participarea premierului si vicelor, si press releases.
inca un pas in cementarea democratiei suverane in rusia, duma de stat in a treia lectura a adoptat modificarile la legea cu privire la referendum. potrivit modificarilor hilare se interzice organizarea referendumului pe probleme care tin exclusiv de competenta organelor federale (guvern, presedentie sau duma), deci practic prin lege se interzice exercitarea dreptului stipulat in constitutia tarii si garantat in orice democratie, cu exceptia cele suverane.
faptul ca Casa Alba se pregateste sa gazduiasca pe noul premier se confirma si prin noul regim in comunicare cu mas media, o noua abordare a fost calificata de reporteri drept "marca inregistrata a Kremlinului". potrivit noilor reglementari accesul libera reprezentantilor presei acreditati pe linga guvern este interzis. comunicare intre mass media si guvern se va realiza de acum incolo in cadrul conferintelor saptaminale dupa sedintele executivului, activitatilor protocolare cu participarea premierului si vicelor, si press releases.
inca un pas in cementarea democratiei suverane in rusia, duma de stat in a treia lectura a adoptat modificarile la legea cu privire la referendum. potrivit modificarilor hilare se interzice organizarea referendumului pe probleme care tin exclusiv de competenta organelor federale (guvern, presedentie sau duma), deci practic prin lege se interzice exercitarea dreptului stipulat in constitutia tarii si garantat in orice democratie, cu exceptia cele suverane.
miercuri, 9 aprilie 2008
Stardust ost
am ascultat Stardust (din cite am auzit un film SF) score compus de Ilan Eshkeri, mi-au placut doua piese Septimus (scurta si foarte dinamica, vioara suna fine) si Coronation (sincer imi aduce aminte de o piesa din Star Wars ost), integral poate fi descarcat de aici.
Ucraina - gaze, trojan horse in UE, aderarea la NATO
Iulia totusi a reusit sa strecoare precizari-modificari in dealul semnat cu Gazprom pentru livrari in 2008 (aici si aici), in primul rand monopolul rus va putea realiza doar 7,5 mlrd m/c, deci "nu mai putin de" 7,5 mlrd m/c a fost eliminat la insistenta partii ucrainene, un fel de preemption impotriva interpretarii extensive acestui pasaj de catre Gazprom, in al doilea rand, din explicatiile Timoshenko rezulta ca Gazpromul va crea "firma-fiica" (Gazprom sbit Ucraina) in Ucraina care va primi gaze de la Naftogaz (compania ucraineana fiind singura probabil care se va ocupa cu devamarea) in vederea realizarii acestor catre consumatori (industriali) determinati din timp.
un editorial in care se fac totalurile summitului NATO din persepctiva moscovei, la final autorul spune un lucru foarte interesant, f usor sarind de la subiectul NATO la UE spune intentiile Ucrainei de a adera la UE nu sunt o problema, argumentul: Ucraina ar putea fi ceea ce UK a fost pt SUA, adica agentul influentei washingtonului in interiorul UE. deci ideea cu trojan horse inside UE (mentionate Grecia si Cipru) dezvoltata in raportul ECFR pe relatia UE-Rusia prinde contur. preconditie pt operationalizarea acestei formule, continua autorul, reprezinta friendly relations cu vecini (adica pe bune o cooperare si nu obstructie) si mai mare "pofta" pt compromis (banuiesc tot in relatiile cu vecini).
ieri in cadrul sedintei CSEEA am avut o dezbatere in jurul declaratiei premierului francez in ajunul summitului NATO pe balanta de putere in Europa si intre Europa si Rusia in contextul si candidaturii Ucrainei si Georgiei la MAP ("We are opposed to the entry of Georgia and Ukraine because we think that it is not a good answer to the balance of power within Europe and between Europe and Russia"-Fillon) . din ce am vazut prin ziare imediat dupa eveniment lumea a pus mai mult accent in aceasta declaratie pe Rusia si dupa parerea mea s-a cam omis prima parte. cautand opinii altor experti am gasit o interpretare in care accentul se pune tocami pe echilibrul de forte in interiorul aliantei. autorul examineaza mai mult relatia europenilor cu SUA. eu propun sa mergem mai departe si sa ne imaginam pt o clipa ce ar insemna aderarea uriasului cum este Ucraina la NATO pentru alianta nu prin prisma raporturilor cu Rusia, dar afacerilor sale interne: impactul asupra componentei militare si decision-making process. un studiu mai amplu pe acest subiect n-ar strica.
un editorial in care se fac totalurile summitului NATO din persepctiva moscovei, la final autorul spune un lucru foarte interesant, f usor sarind de la subiectul NATO la UE spune intentiile Ucrainei de a adera la UE nu sunt o problema, argumentul: Ucraina ar putea fi ceea ce UK a fost pt SUA, adica agentul influentei washingtonului in interiorul UE. deci ideea cu trojan horse inside UE (mentionate Grecia si Cipru) dezvoltata in raportul ECFR pe relatia UE-Rusia prinde contur. preconditie pt operationalizarea acestei formule, continua autorul, reprezinta friendly relations cu vecini (adica pe bune o cooperare si nu obstructie) si mai mare "pofta" pt compromis (banuiesc tot in relatiile cu vecini).
ieri in cadrul sedintei CSEEA am avut o dezbatere in jurul declaratiei premierului francez in ajunul summitului NATO pe balanta de putere in Europa si intre Europa si Rusia in contextul si candidaturii Ucrainei si Georgiei la MAP ("We are opposed to the entry of Georgia and Ukraine because we think that it is not a good answer to the balance of power within Europe and between Europe and Russia"-Fillon) . din ce am vazut prin ziare imediat dupa eveniment lumea a pus mai mult accent in aceasta declaratie pe Rusia si dupa parerea mea s-a cam omis prima parte. cautand opinii altor experti am gasit o interpretare in care accentul se pune tocami pe echilibrul de forte in interiorul aliantei. autorul examineaza mai mult relatia europenilor cu SUA. eu propun sa mergem mai departe si sa ne imaginam pt o clipa ce ar insemna aderarea uriasului cum este Ucraina la NATO pentru alianta nu prin prisma raporturilor cu Rusia, dar afacerilor sale interne: impactul asupra componentei militare si decision-making process. un studiu mai amplu pe acest subiect n-ar strica.
marți, 8 aprilie 2008
Centrul de Studii Est-Europene si Asiatice (SNSPA)
pe linga SNSPA a fost creat Centrul de Studii Est-Europene si Asiatice, din cite stiu este primul think-tank in Romania dedicat exclusiv spatiului ex-sovietic, sa speram ca nu si ultimul, mai ales daca privim peste gard la polonezi si actvitatea pe care o desfasoara deja numeroase institutii de cercetare care acopera vecinatatea estica a UE si atrag in acest sens fonduri europene. iata si site-ul CSEEA lansat recent si prmul newsletter.
luni, 7 aprilie 2008
ganduri post-summit NATO (Bucuresti-Sochi)
saptaman trecuta a fost f fina, pt 7 zile politica externa Romaniei si relatiile internationale in general sub lupa presei 24/24, chiar si daca s-au strecuruta informatii inexacte sau interpretari pripite, important ca atentia s-a focalizat anume pe acest subiect, oferind o pauza necesara politicii interne. a pus capacul saptamanii pozitive meciul de ieri, ceea ce parea imposibil la inceputul returului, mai ales dupa meciul cu Iasi, s-a realizat, i-am ajuns din urma pe clujeni! ne asteapta (pe cei patimasi) o luna alba, similara noptilor albe la St.Petersburg.
in continuare digerez summitul nato si declaratia de la Sochi (textul integral aici). conferinta de presa lui Putin a repetat mesajul traditional, nu ne excludeti (a mai zis), dar si vom obstructiona eforturile Vs. daca nu ne ascultati ofurile si nu renegociem termenii de cooperare (elaborate prin 90), anume asa cred ca trebuie citit pasujul cu fara noi lupta cu terorismul si proliferarea nu sunt eficiente si chiar posibile (confirma ce scria Trenin in ultimul brief titlul spune totul "prinujdenie k partnerstvu"). alta conferinta de presa, de data asta la Sochi (transcriptul aici), confirma ca discutia despre scutul global din partea rusiei este un bla-bla, deoarece asa cu insasi Putin a spus la Bucuresti un astfel de sistem trebuie sa parcurga 3 faze in dezvoltarea sa: 1. evaluarea pericolelor (adica impotriva cui il facem), ceea ce presupune o perceptie comuna asupra amenintarilor, prin urmare doar discutia contradictorie intre EU, SUA si Rusia pe ce constituie pericol imenent sau previzibil, poate cu abilitatea diplomatiei ruse dura citiva ani. sa presupunem ca se trece de aceasta faza, si este parcursa cu succes urmatoarea adica instalarea sistemului propriu zis, Putin insista asupra "controlului democratic" asupra acestuia, adica operationalizarea sa aiba loc cu acordul celor trei (nu prea este clar inca mecanismul de reprezentare in cazul Europei), ceea ce inseamna drept de veto a Rusiei pe problemele vitale (pace si razboi) a comunitatii euro-atlantice.
in final am citit declaratia de la Sochi, ce pot sa spun, o colectie impresionanta de "vom" ("budem" sau "we will"), cit de realizabila este agenda in realitatea ramane sa observam incepand cu 7 mai pt Rusia si ianuarie 2009 in SUA, caci s-a dorit un fel de testament a celor doi pt urmasi. si inca ceva, declaratia spune ca partile vor conlucra implicand si alte state in vederea solutionarii problemelor legate de provocarile sec 21 transformind relatiile ruso-americane din situatia competitiei strategice la parteneriat strategic, intrebarea mea este ce au facut din 90 incoace, ce au insemnat Charter of U.S.-Russian Partnership and Friendship din 17 iunie 1992 delcratia Clinton-Eltin de la Vancouver 4 aprilie 1993, tratele START si SORT si multe alte chestii frumoase, care were supposed sa transforme aceasta relatie deja in ceva palpabil.
in continuare digerez summitul nato si declaratia de la Sochi (textul integral aici). conferinta de presa lui Putin a repetat mesajul traditional, nu ne excludeti (a mai zis), dar si vom obstructiona eforturile Vs. daca nu ne ascultati ofurile si nu renegociem termenii de cooperare (elaborate prin 90), anume asa cred ca trebuie citit pasujul cu fara noi lupta cu terorismul si proliferarea nu sunt eficiente si chiar posibile (confirma ce scria Trenin in ultimul brief titlul spune totul "prinujdenie k partnerstvu"). alta conferinta de presa, de data asta la Sochi (transcriptul aici), confirma ca discutia despre scutul global din partea rusiei este un bla-bla, deoarece asa cu insasi Putin a spus la Bucuresti un astfel de sistem trebuie sa parcurga 3 faze in dezvoltarea sa: 1. evaluarea pericolelor (adica impotriva cui il facem), ceea ce presupune o perceptie comuna asupra amenintarilor, prin urmare doar discutia contradictorie intre EU, SUA si Rusia pe ce constituie pericol imenent sau previzibil, poate cu abilitatea diplomatiei ruse dura citiva ani. sa presupunem ca se trece de aceasta faza, si este parcursa cu succes urmatoarea adica instalarea sistemului propriu zis, Putin insista asupra "controlului democratic" asupra acestuia, adica operationalizarea sa aiba loc cu acordul celor trei (nu prea este clar inca mecanismul de reprezentare in cazul Europei), ceea ce inseamna drept de veto a Rusiei pe problemele vitale (pace si razboi) a comunitatii euro-atlantice.
in final am citit declaratia de la Sochi, ce pot sa spun, o colectie impresionanta de "vom" ("budem" sau "we will"), cit de realizabila este agenda in realitatea ramane sa observam incepand cu 7 mai pt Rusia si ianuarie 2009 in SUA, caci s-a dorit un fel de testament a celor doi pt urmasi. si inca ceva, declaratia spune ca partile vor conlucra implicand si alte state in vederea solutionarii problemelor legate de provocarile sec 21 transformind relatiile ruso-americane din situatia competitiei strategice la parteneriat strategic, intrebarea mea este ce au facut din 90 incoace, ce au insemnat Charter of U.S.-Russian Partnership and Friendship din 17 iunie 1992 delcratia Clinton-Eltin de la Vancouver 4 aprilie 1993, tratele START si SORT si multe alte chestii frumoase, care were supposed sa transforme aceasta relatie deja in ceva palpabil.
sâmbătă, 5 aprilie 2008
cine e dl.Markov, ce a spus/n-a spus Putin, impresii dupa summit Nato
- realitatea tv l-a citat pe Markov prezentind drept consilierul guvernului rus, este o informatie inexacta, cine este dl.Markov, neoficial e un spin-doctor al Kremlinului ceva mai inferior lui Gleb Pavlovskii (cel care are si o emisiune propagandistica pe NTV), sarcina de baza manipularea (politehnologhia) prin sonorizarea, multiplicarea si interpretarea mesajului Kremlinului in interior si cum am vazut in exterior (spunea ca a contribuit la scrierea speech-ului catrea adunarea federala din 2004 pt Putin). a condus Institutul pt Studii Politice de pe aceste pozitii s-a implicat in alegerile din Ucraina in 2004 in incercarea de a asigura victoria lui Ianukovici, a fost tentat sa repete isprava in Moldova (a recunoscut singur acest lucru) dar a avut probleme cu sedere in tara. a fost membru in Public chamber creatia Kremlinului care aduna la un loc reprezentantii "societatii civile" (loiale) si oameni reprezentativi pt societatea rusa. in 2007 a fost ales deputat in legislativul rus pe listele Edinaya Rossya si in prezent este al doilea om in comisia Dumei pt organizatii nonguvernamentale (ultima informatie usor de verificat aici).
- iarasi realtatea tv a pusa in gura lui Putin ceea ce el nu a declarat la Bucuresti, inteleg resentimentul fata de politica promovata de Rusia si dorinta de a da pe post ceva senzational, dar atunci cand pretinzi a fi un CNN romanesc un pic de profesionalism nu ar strica. am verificat inregistrarea conferintei si am recitit transcriptul (totul in original si nu traducere care a fost incompleta), Putin nu a declarat ca statalitatea Ucrainei ar fi amenitata daca Kievul va adera la NATO. ba mai mult, Ucraina a fost mentionata doar o singura data in raspunsul sau cu privire la democratie. In acelasi timp, pe linga minciuni cu Istanbul 1999 (textul documentului pt comparatie aici) sau prezentarea acordului de tranzit incarcaturii nonmilitare pe teritoriul rus ca o favoare pt NATO (in timp ce cit de paradoxal nu pare succesul NATO in Afganistan este o necesitate pt Rusia), Putin a spus multe lucruri interesante, principalul mesaj desi exprimat foarte arogant - NATO este o realitate si noi cautam modalitate de a se acomoda, nu ne excludeti, dorim cooperare conditionata de sensibilitatea la preocuparile rusiei. nu consider sedinta NRC drept una revolutionara, este un impuls, care poate esua sau transforma relatie birocratica intensa in ceva mai mult decat simple consultari pe diverse probleme si exercitii ocazionale.
- Primele impresii la cald dupa summit. Organizarea foarte buna cu o singura exceptie minora, de fapt o problema care nu este noua, traducerea din rusa in romana (nu doar in domeniu politic), din cite imi aduc aminte inca de la intrevederea Kasianov-Nastase (noroc ca presedintele Iliescu vorbea rusa la Moscova in vizita sa), conferinta de presa TSKA Moscova, si acum la intilnirea Putin-Basescu. Pt o clipa cand Putin a repetat pt a doua oara invitatia pt presedinte Basescu la Moscova am crezut ca intelege pe ascuns si romana, in realitate nu a auzit in traducere cuvintul “Moscova” (deci era foarte atent la ce spunea traducatorul si a sesizat ca ceva lipseste in traducere) si a repetat ultima propozitie. Depasind acest aspect se face o interpretare primitiva summitului SUA a pierdut, “tarul” Putin a iesit castigator. Well nu stiu daca se poate considera extinderea aliantei (chiar si macedonia este de facto membru, invitatia este pe masa, mai degraba a fost strategia de negociere gresita a skopje, decat esecul altora), decizia ca Georgia si Ucraina vor deveni membre, suplimentarea trupelor in Afghanistan, semnarea acordului cu Cehia pt amplasarea radarului, recunoasterea de NATO necesitatii scutului si evaluarea posibilitatii de cuplare, ca esec sau infrangere pt diplomatia americana. daca punem aici acordul semnat de Rusia cu NATO de tranzit (reciproc avantajos) si discutii in care rusia chiar si daca se opune retoric in acelasi timp discuta conditiile amplasari scutului (lucrul probabil care va fi formalizat la Sochi), atunci nu vad de unde vine aprecierea de zero-sum game.
vineri, 4 aprilie 2008
cum se face politica - decizia NAC pe Ucraina si Georgia
iata inside information oferita de ministrul de externe ceh prin RFE cum s-a luat decizia pe Ucraina si Georgia .
"RFE/RL: Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko called what happened today "better" than a MAP. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili called it a "geopolitical coup." It looks like the Georgians and the Ukrainians got even more than they had hoped for. Just how important was the agreement that was reached today?
Karel Schwarzenberg: Well, I think it was a very interesting discussion, because there were two [opposing] views on it. There were some states, led by the United States, the Poles, us [the Czech Republic] and so on, who were supportive for the MAP for Ukraine and Georgia. And there were states that were very careful in opposing it, more or less led by Germany and France. The discussion was carried on...over the whole evening [on April 2]. [On the morning of April 3] there was a committee [meeting] to hammer out a common text; and finally, with the Americans and the Germans, it was hammered out. This paper was [distributed]. The first text wasn't bad. When [Polish Foreign Minister] Radek Sikorski and I looked at it, we said it is not the dream text, but we could live with it. But then, the Polish President Lech Kaczynski came and said it isn't acceptable for him and then the discussion started. Then it separated. The Poles led a group, mainly the Baltic States, out of the room. They had a caucus, I think this is what the Americans called it. Then again there was a meeting [with all members], and this final text came out.
RFE/RL: What was missing in the original text that caused Kaczynski to oppose it?
Schwarzenberg: There wasn't such a [strong] commitment to the final acceptance of Ukraine and Georgia as [eventual] members of NATO. It didn't have such a strong commitment as now. And as I understand, they [Poland] like the final text very much.
RFE/RL: So the Polish role in this was very large?
Schwarzenberg: It was very important. Very important. But, of course, the Poles had several countries supporting them, too.
RFE/RL: And that would be the Czechs and the Baltic states?
Schwarzenberg: I think we were very supportive.
RFE/RL: How hard was it to get the Germans and the French to come around?
Schwarzenberg: I think it was very tough for them, but finally they agreed.
RFE/RL: Do you expect another battle at the foreign ministers' meeting in December, or do you expect this to sail through? Can we expect MAPs for Georgia and Ukraine at the foreign ministers' meeting?
Schwarzenberg: I think there will be a discussion in December, of course.
RFE/RL: But it will be an easier discussion than today?
Schwarzenberg: I don't want to overestimate our role. Foreign ministers are focused on the topic they are discussing. Heads of state need to look around and look more for the political mood in their country and [think about] the political success of their political party and their government. Ministers of foreign affairs are more engaged in foreign affairs itself."
"RFE/RL: Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko called what happened today "better" than a MAP. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili called it a "geopolitical coup." It looks like the Georgians and the Ukrainians got even more than they had hoped for. Just how important was the agreement that was reached today?
Karel Schwarzenberg: Well, I think it was a very interesting discussion, because there were two [opposing] views on it. There were some states, led by the United States, the Poles, us [the Czech Republic] and so on, who were supportive for the MAP for Ukraine and Georgia. And there were states that were very careful in opposing it, more or less led by Germany and France. The discussion was carried on...over the whole evening [on April 2]. [On the morning of April 3] there was a committee [meeting] to hammer out a common text; and finally, with the Americans and the Germans, it was hammered out. This paper was [distributed]. The first text wasn't bad. When [Polish Foreign Minister] Radek Sikorski and I looked at it, we said it is not the dream text, but we could live with it. But then, the Polish President Lech Kaczynski came and said it isn't acceptable for him and then the discussion started. Then it separated. The Poles led a group, mainly the Baltic States, out of the room. They had a caucus, I think this is what the Americans called it. Then again there was a meeting [with all members], and this final text came out.
RFE/RL: What was missing in the original text that caused Kaczynski to oppose it?
Schwarzenberg: There wasn't such a [strong] commitment to the final acceptance of Ukraine and Georgia as [eventual] members of NATO. It didn't have such a strong commitment as now. And as I understand, they [Poland] like the final text very much.
RFE/RL: So the Polish role in this was very large?
Schwarzenberg: It was very important. Very important. But, of course, the Poles had several countries supporting them, too.
RFE/RL: And that would be the Czechs and the Baltic states?
Schwarzenberg: I think we were very supportive.
RFE/RL: How hard was it to get the Germans and the French to come around?
Schwarzenberg: I think it was very tough for them, but finally they agreed.
RFE/RL: Do you expect another battle at the foreign ministers' meeting in December, or do you expect this to sail through? Can we expect MAPs for Georgia and Ukraine at the foreign ministers' meeting?
Schwarzenberg: I think there will be a discussion in December, of course.
RFE/RL: But it will be an easier discussion than today?
Schwarzenberg: I don't want to overestimate our role. Foreign ministers are focused on the topic they are discussing. Heads of state need to look around and look more for the political mood in their country and [think about] the political success of their political party and their government. Ministers of foreign affairs are more engaged in foreign affairs itself."
Statement of NATO-Russia Council
The Heads of State and Government of the NATO-Russia Council met today in Bucharest and resolved to enhance their work as 27 equal partners to respond together to the multi-faceted security risks we have in common. They renewed their commitment to the goals, principles and objectives set forth in the Founding Act and the Rome Declaration. They affirmed that the NRC was conceived as a strategic element in fostering Euro-Atlantic security, proceeding from the principle that the security of all states in the Euro-Atlantic community, to which they belong, remains indivisible. Our partnership has already had a good history of over a decade. During that time, NRC member states have developed a political dialogue on a broad range of international security issues and concrete projects where they have common goals and interests.
As dialogue among its members has broadened and intensified, the NRC has proven to be a useful forum for frank and open exchanges including on issues where views have differed, such as: NATO's Transformation including enlargement; missile defence; the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and Kosovo. NRC member states will remain committed to the long-term viability of the CFE Treaty Regime. NRC member states will continue, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Rome Declaration and subsequent decisions of the NRC, to seek, through continued dialogue as part of a multi-faceted approach, to facilitate resolution of outstanding CFE issues. Acknowledging differences on Kosovo, the NRC remains committed to bringing about a stable, democratic, multi-ethnic, peaceful, and secure future for the Western Balkans. NRC members called on all in the Western Balkans to renounce violence and to avoid any actions that could undermine the security and rule of law in the region. Issues related to security in Kosovo remain high on their agenda. The NRC will continue its open and active dialogue on Missile Defence, despite differences on this matter.
The NRC agreed that the success of international efforts in support of the Afghan Government in promoting peace and stability in and around Afghanistan is of utmost importance. Towards that end, a mechanism has been defined to facilitate land transit through Russian territory of goods to ISAF in accordance with UNSCR 1386. Recognising the threat of narcotics trafficking in the region, the NRC today also decided to make the NRC Pilot Project for Counter-Narcotics Training of Afghan and Central Asian Personnel an ongoing NRC initiative.
The fight against terrorism remains a key area of NRC cooperation. The NRC will continue its work in implementing the NRC Action Plan on Terrorism, in particular efforts to deny terrorists access to Weapons of Mass Destruction. The NRC highly values its continued naval cooperation in the framework of NATO’s Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean, which continues to make a significant contribution to the fight against terrorism. The Heads of State and Government of the NRC tasked the NRC to expedite work on the NRC’s joint project to counter terrorist threats to civil aviation, the Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI), so that the CAI system will reach its initial operational capability by the end of 2008 and full operational capability about the end of 2009.
The NRC will continue to enhance its dialogue in support of efforts against proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery.
The Heads of State and Government of the NRC commended progress in the NRC project towards developing interoperability among respective Theatre Missile Defence systems. The NRC conducted a successful Theatre Missile Defence exercise in January 2008 in Germany. Offers put forward by other NRC members to host exercises in future were also appreciated. Defence and military cooperation within the NRC has also helped to promote interoperability and transparency. The NRC will continue to enhance military to military work, as it enters a phase where more practical activities are pursued, as demonstrated, for example, by the successful endeavours in Search and Rescue at Sea. The Heads of State and Government of the NRC have tasked the NRC to intensify efforts to conclude a Framework Agreement on Air Transport and subsequent Implementing Arrangements for the use of Russian Armed Forces’ air transport capability. The NRC also values the positive results of the NATO-Russia Centre for the Resettlement of Discharged Military Personnel from the Russian Armed Forces.
The NRC will enhance its important cooperation in civil emergency planning, scientific and environmental projects, to increase its preparedness and protection against acts of terrorism, and natural and man-made disasters.
The Heads of State and Government of the NRC are convinced that there remains ample room for increasing public awareness of NRC activities, including through the internet (www.nato-russia-council.info). To this end, they tasked the NRC to expedite work to facilitate other forms of dialogue among political scientists; the academic community; research institutions; and other relevant organisations.
Six years after its creation, the NATO-Russia Council has proven itself to be a key instrument for political dialogue, consensus-building, cooperation and joint decision-making by its 27 members acting in their national capacities and in a manner consistent with their collective commitments and obligations. The Heads of State and Government of the NRC reaffirmed their determination to continue to work in this constructive spirit in the future to ensure the NRC fulfils its potential by identifying and pursuing opportunities for joint action on a wide range of security issues.
As dialogue among its members has broadened and intensified, the NRC has proven to be a useful forum for frank and open exchanges including on issues where views have differed, such as: NATO's Transformation including enlargement; missile defence; the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and Kosovo. NRC member states will remain committed to the long-term viability of the CFE Treaty Regime. NRC member states will continue, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Rome Declaration and subsequent decisions of the NRC, to seek, through continued dialogue as part of a multi-faceted approach, to facilitate resolution of outstanding CFE issues. Acknowledging differences on Kosovo, the NRC remains committed to bringing about a stable, democratic, multi-ethnic, peaceful, and secure future for the Western Balkans. NRC members called on all in the Western Balkans to renounce violence and to avoid any actions that could undermine the security and rule of law in the region. Issues related to security in Kosovo remain high on their agenda. The NRC will continue its open and active dialogue on Missile Defence, despite differences on this matter.
The NRC agreed that the success of international efforts in support of the Afghan Government in promoting peace and stability in and around Afghanistan is of utmost importance. Towards that end, a mechanism has been defined to facilitate land transit through Russian territory of goods to ISAF in accordance with UNSCR 1386. Recognising the threat of narcotics trafficking in the region, the NRC today also decided to make the NRC Pilot Project for Counter-Narcotics Training of Afghan and Central Asian Personnel an ongoing NRC initiative.
The fight against terrorism remains a key area of NRC cooperation. The NRC will continue its work in implementing the NRC Action Plan on Terrorism, in particular efforts to deny terrorists access to Weapons of Mass Destruction. The NRC highly values its continued naval cooperation in the framework of NATO’s Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean, which continues to make a significant contribution to the fight against terrorism. The Heads of State and Government of the NRC tasked the NRC to expedite work on the NRC’s joint project to counter terrorist threats to civil aviation, the Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI), so that the CAI system will reach its initial operational capability by the end of 2008 and full operational capability about the end of 2009.
The NRC will continue to enhance its dialogue in support of efforts against proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery.
The Heads of State and Government of the NRC commended progress in the NRC project towards developing interoperability among respective Theatre Missile Defence systems. The NRC conducted a successful Theatre Missile Defence exercise in January 2008 in Germany. Offers put forward by other NRC members to host exercises in future were also appreciated. Defence and military cooperation within the NRC has also helped to promote interoperability and transparency. The NRC will continue to enhance military to military work, as it enters a phase where more practical activities are pursued, as demonstrated, for example, by the successful endeavours in Search and Rescue at Sea. The Heads of State and Government of the NRC have tasked the NRC to intensify efforts to conclude a Framework Agreement on Air Transport and subsequent Implementing Arrangements for the use of Russian Armed Forces’ air transport capability. The NRC also values the positive results of the NATO-Russia Centre for the Resettlement of Discharged Military Personnel from the Russian Armed Forces.
The NRC will enhance its important cooperation in civil emergency planning, scientific and environmental projects, to increase its preparedness and protection against acts of terrorism, and natural and man-made disasters.
The Heads of State and Government of the NRC are convinced that there remains ample room for increasing public awareness of NRC activities, including through the internet (www.nato-russia-council.info). To this end, they tasked the NRC to expedite work to facilitate other forms of dialogue among political scientists; the academic community; research institutions; and other relevant organisations.
Six years after its creation, the NATO-Russia Council has proven itself to be a key instrument for political dialogue, consensus-building, cooperation and joint decision-making by its 27 members acting in their national capacities and in a manner consistent with their collective commitments and obligations. The Heads of State and Government of the NRC reaffirmed their determination to continue to work in this constructive spirit in the future to ensure the NRC fulfils its potential by identifying and pursuing opportunities for joint action on a wide range of security issues.
Declaratia Consiliului Nord Atlantic pe CFE
NATO Allies remain firmly committed to the CFE Treaty and wish to achieve the earliest possible entry into force of the Agreement on Adaptation.
Since 1990, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) has provided a verifiable and legally binding framework governing the conventional armaments of the States Parties within the area of its application. Its unique system of limitations, information on military forces and opportunities for cooperative verification has resulted in an unprecedented degree of predictability, transparency and mutual confidence. The CFE Treaty, including its flank regime, has proven to be essential to building mutually beneficial and cooperative military relationships among the States Parties, helping to establish a new culture of mutually cooperative restraint in Europe.
The Treaty has been successful in achieving its objectives and maintaining them for the past almost sixteen years and proven its viability during a period of fundamental political change which marked the beginning of a new era of cooperation on security and disarmament issues in Europe. To reflect these changes, the Adapted CFE Treaty was signed in 1999.
Allies look forward to ratifying the Adapted CFE Treaty, in a manner consistent with the Alliance’s position of principle contained in paragraph 42 of the 2006 NATO Riga Summit Declaration, the final statement by Allies at the CFE Extraordinary Conference in Vienna and Alliance statements reflecting subsequent developments. Entry into force of the Adapted Treaty would permit accession by new States Parties, which the Alliance supports. The Adapted Treaty also reaffirms the principle that foreign forces can only be stationed on the territory of a member of the Treaty with that State’s free consent.
Allies have taken careful note of concerns expressed by the Russian Federation about the conditions under which the Treaty is operating, including with regard to the flank regime, NATO equipment levels and accession to CFE. In fall 2007, the United States, with the full support of all NATO Allies, proposed to Russia a package of parallel actions, which, taken together, address all of the concerns Russia has raised with regard to CFE and related issues. All Allies are committed to this far-reaching package, which includes resolution of Russia’s commitments related to the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, and are ready to join with Russia in its implementation. The package looks ahead to entry into force of the Adapted CFE Treaty and to its subsequent review to take account of changes since 1999. It addresses the concerns of all our CFE partners. The “parallel actions” package will achieve major results.
Upon agreement by NATO and Russia on the parallel actions package:
NATO Allies will move forward on ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty in parallel with implementation of specific, agreed steps by the Russian Federation to resolve outstanding issues related to Russian forces/facilities in the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, as outlined in the package.
NATO and Russia will urge all CFE states to join in a political commitment to act in a manner consistent with the object and purpose of the Adapted CFE Treaty until it enters into force, and to observe all its equipment ceilings.
The NATO members that are not Parties to the CFE Treaty will publicly reiterate their readiness to request accession to the Adapted Treaty as soon as it enters into force. Following consultations with Allies, they will be open to discussions with all States Parties to the Treaty, including with Russia, on the conditions for their accession.
NATO and Russia will develop a definition of the term “substantial combat forces” as it is used in the NATO-Russia Founding Act.
Once the Adapted Treaty is in force:
NATO Allies will review the operation of the Adapted CFE Treaty with Russia and other Treaty parties. As part of this review, we would consider changes, where possible, to the level of equipment ceilings. This would be an opportunity for all Treaty Partners including Russia to raise their concerns about any specific elements of the Adapted Treaty.
We regret that the Russian Federation chose unilaterally to suspend implementation of the CFE Treaty while this important package is under discussion. Allies have continued fully to implement their obligations under the CFE Treaty in good faith. This situation cannot be sustained indefinitely. Russia’s “suspension” risks eroding the integrity of the CFE regime and undermines the cooperative approach to security which has been a core of the NATO-Russia relationship and European security for nearly two decades.
We urge the Russian Federation to end its “suspension”, and to work with us to reach agreement on the basis of the parallel actions package so we can together preserve the benefits of this landmark regime.
Allies remain committed to a continued dialogue with the Russian Federation that addresses all outstanding concerns in order to preserve the long term viability of the CFE regime.
Since 1990, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) has provided a verifiable and legally binding framework governing the conventional armaments of the States Parties within the area of its application. Its unique system of limitations, information on military forces and opportunities for cooperative verification has resulted in an unprecedented degree of predictability, transparency and mutual confidence. The CFE Treaty, including its flank regime, has proven to be essential to building mutually beneficial and cooperative military relationships among the States Parties, helping to establish a new culture of mutually cooperative restraint in Europe.
The Treaty has been successful in achieving its objectives and maintaining them for the past almost sixteen years and proven its viability during a period of fundamental political change which marked the beginning of a new era of cooperation on security and disarmament issues in Europe. To reflect these changes, the Adapted CFE Treaty was signed in 1999.
Allies look forward to ratifying the Adapted CFE Treaty, in a manner consistent with the Alliance’s position of principle contained in paragraph 42 of the 2006 NATO Riga Summit Declaration, the final statement by Allies at the CFE Extraordinary Conference in Vienna and Alliance statements reflecting subsequent developments. Entry into force of the Adapted Treaty would permit accession by new States Parties, which the Alliance supports. The Adapted Treaty also reaffirms the principle that foreign forces can only be stationed on the territory of a member of the Treaty with that State’s free consent.
Allies have taken careful note of concerns expressed by the Russian Federation about the conditions under which the Treaty is operating, including with regard to the flank regime, NATO equipment levels and accession to CFE. In fall 2007, the United States, with the full support of all NATO Allies, proposed to Russia a package of parallel actions, which, taken together, address all of the concerns Russia has raised with regard to CFE and related issues. All Allies are committed to this far-reaching package, which includes resolution of Russia’s commitments related to the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, and are ready to join with Russia in its implementation. The package looks ahead to entry into force of the Adapted CFE Treaty and to its subsequent review to take account of changes since 1999. It addresses the concerns of all our CFE partners. The “parallel actions” package will achieve major results.
Upon agreement by NATO and Russia on the parallel actions package:
NATO Allies will move forward on ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty in parallel with implementation of specific, agreed steps by the Russian Federation to resolve outstanding issues related to Russian forces/facilities in the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, as outlined in the package.
NATO and Russia will urge all CFE states to join in a political commitment to act in a manner consistent with the object and purpose of the Adapted CFE Treaty until it enters into force, and to observe all its equipment ceilings.
The NATO members that are not Parties to the CFE Treaty will publicly reiterate their readiness to request accession to the Adapted Treaty as soon as it enters into force. Following consultations with Allies, they will be open to discussions with all States Parties to the Treaty, including with Russia, on the conditions for their accession.
NATO and Russia will develop a definition of the term “substantial combat forces” as it is used in the NATO-Russia Founding Act.
Once the Adapted Treaty is in force:
NATO Allies will review the operation of the Adapted CFE Treaty with Russia and other Treaty parties. As part of this review, we would consider changes, where possible, to the level of equipment ceilings. This would be an opportunity for all Treaty Partners including Russia to raise their concerns about any specific elements of the Adapted Treaty.
We regret that the Russian Federation chose unilaterally to suspend implementation of the CFE Treaty while this important package is under discussion. Allies have continued fully to implement their obligations under the CFE Treaty in good faith. This situation cannot be sustained indefinitely. Russia’s “suspension” risks eroding the integrity of the CFE regime and undermines the cooperative approach to security which has been a core of the NATO-Russia relationship and European security for nearly two decades.
We urge the Russian Federation to end its “suspension”, and to work with us to reach agreement on the basis of the parallel actions package so we can together preserve the benefits of this landmark regime.
Allies remain committed to a continued dialogue with the Russian Federation that addresses all outstanding concerns in order to preserve the long term viability of the CFE regime.
Bucharest summit declaration (Rusia-CSI, energy)
iata pasajele din declaratia finala care se refera la Rusia, Georgia, Ucraina, Moldova, Caucazul de Sud, Asia Centrala, Marea Neagra si securitatea energetica. intreaga declaratie aici. nu impartasesc pesimismul multor comentatori cu privire la decizia pe Georgia si Ucraina, pt mine fraza cheie este cea ca cele doua state vor deveni membre NATO si imputernicirea MFA tarilor membre de a decide asupra subiectului MAP la finele 2008. pt Georgia important testul scrutinului parlamentar.
"NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO. Both nations have made valuable contributions to Alliance operations. We welcome the democratic reforms in Ukraine and Georgia and look forward to free and fair parliamentary elections in Georgia in May. MAP is the next step for Ukraine and Georgia on their direct way to membership. Today we make clear that we support these countries’ applications for MAP. Therefore we will now begin a period of intensive engagement with both at a high political level to address the questions still outstanding pertaining to their MAP applications. We have asked Foreign Ministers to make a first assessment of progress at their December 2008 meeting. Foreign Ministers have the authority to decide on the MAP applications of Ukraine and Georgia.
We recall that the NATO Russia partnership was conceived as a strategic element in fostering security in the Euro Atlantic area, based on core principles, values and commitments, including democracy, civil liberties and political pluralism. Looking back at a history of more than a decade, we have developed a political dialogue as well as concrete projects in a broad range of international security issues where we have common goals and interests. While we are concerned by recent Russian statements and actions on key security issues of mutual concern, such as the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), we stand ready to continue working with Russia as equal partners in areas of common concern, as envisaged by the Rome Declaration and the Founding Act. We should continue our common efforts in the fight against terrorism and in the area of non proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery. We urge Russia to engage actively in important cooperative offers that have been extended. We believe that United States Russia bilateral discussions on missile defence and CFE, among other issues, can make an important contribution in this field. We believe the potential of the NATO Russia Council is not fully realised and we remain ready to identify and pursue opportunities for joint actions at 27, while recalling the principle of independence of decision making and actions by NATO or Russia. We reaffirm to Russia that NATO’s Open Door policy and current, as well as any future, NATO Missile Defence efforts are intended to better address the security challenges we all face, and reiterate that, far from posing a threat to our relationship, they offer opportunities to deepen levels of cooperation and stability.
We note Russia’s ratification of the Partnership for Peace Status of Forces Agreement, and hope that it will facilitate further practical cooperation. We appreciate Russia's readiness to support NATO's ISAF mission in Afghanistan by facilitating transit through Russian territory. We would welcome deepened NATO Russia cooperation in support of, and agreed by, the Government of Afghanistan, and look forward to building on the solid work already achieved in training Afghan and Central Asian counter narcotics officers. Our continued cooperation under our Cooperative Airspace Initiative and Russia’s support to Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean contribute to our common fight against terrorism. We also welcome our cooperation on military interoperability, theatre missile defence, search and rescue at sea, and civil emergency planning.
Recalling our Istanbul Summit decision, we are committed to engage our Partners in the strategically important regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia, including by strengthening liaison arrangements in these regions, and will continue dialogue with our Central Asian Partners on Afghanistan.
We also commend the work already underway to strengthen NATO Russia missile defence cooperation. We are committed to maximum transparency and reciprocal confidence building measures to allay any concerns. We encourage the Russian Federation to take advantage of United States missile defence cooperation proposals and we are ready to explore the potential for linking United States, NATO and Russian missile defence systems at an appropriate time.
We are concerned with the persistence of regional conflicts in the South Caucasus and the Republic of Moldova. Our nations support the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova. We will continue to support efforts towards a peaceful settlement of these regional conflicts, taking into account these principles.
We have noted a report “NATO’s Role in Energy Security”, prepared in response to the tasking of the Riga Summit. Allies have identified principles which will govern NATO’s approach in this field, and outlined options and recommendations for further activities. Based on these principles, NATO will engage in the following fields: information and intelligence fusion and sharing; projecting stability; advancing international and regional cooperation; supporting consequence management; and supporting the protection of critical energy infrastructure. The Alliance will continue to consult on the most immediate risks in the field of energy security. We will ensure that NATO’s endeavours add value and are fully coordinated and embedded within those of the international community, which features a number of organisations that are specialised in energy security. We have tasked the Council in Permanent Session to prepare a consolidated report on the progress achieved in the area of energy security for our consideration at the 2009 Summit.
We reaffirm the continued importance of the Black Sea region for Euro Atlantic security. In this regard, we welcome the progress in consolidation of regional ownership, through effective use of existing initiatives and mechanisms. The Alliance will continue to support, as appropriate, these efforts guided by regional priorities and based on transparency, complementarity and inclusiveness, in order to develop dialogue and cooperation among the Black Sea states and with the Alliance."
"NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO. Both nations have made valuable contributions to Alliance operations. We welcome the democratic reforms in Ukraine and Georgia and look forward to free and fair parliamentary elections in Georgia in May. MAP is the next step for Ukraine and Georgia on their direct way to membership. Today we make clear that we support these countries’ applications for MAP. Therefore we will now begin a period of intensive engagement with both at a high political level to address the questions still outstanding pertaining to their MAP applications. We have asked Foreign Ministers to make a first assessment of progress at their December 2008 meeting. Foreign Ministers have the authority to decide on the MAP applications of Ukraine and Georgia.
We recall that the NATO Russia partnership was conceived as a strategic element in fostering security in the Euro Atlantic area, based on core principles, values and commitments, including democracy, civil liberties and political pluralism. Looking back at a history of more than a decade, we have developed a political dialogue as well as concrete projects in a broad range of international security issues where we have common goals and interests. While we are concerned by recent Russian statements and actions on key security issues of mutual concern, such as the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), we stand ready to continue working with Russia as equal partners in areas of common concern, as envisaged by the Rome Declaration and the Founding Act. We should continue our common efforts in the fight against terrorism and in the area of non proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery. We urge Russia to engage actively in important cooperative offers that have been extended. We believe that United States Russia bilateral discussions on missile defence and CFE, among other issues, can make an important contribution in this field. We believe the potential of the NATO Russia Council is not fully realised and we remain ready to identify and pursue opportunities for joint actions at 27, while recalling the principle of independence of decision making and actions by NATO or Russia. We reaffirm to Russia that NATO’s Open Door policy and current, as well as any future, NATO Missile Defence efforts are intended to better address the security challenges we all face, and reiterate that, far from posing a threat to our relationship, they offer opportunities to deepen levels of cooperation and stability.
We note Russia’s ratification of the Partnership for Peace Status of Forces Agreement, and hope that it will facilitate further practical cooperation. We appreciate Russia's readiness to support NATO's ISAF mission in Afghanistan by facilitating transit through Russian territory. We would welcome deepened NATO Russia cooperation in support of, and agreed by, the Government of Afghanistan, and look forward to building on the solid work already achieved in training Afghan and Central Asian counter narcotics officers. Our continued cooperation under our Cooperative Airspace Initiative and Russia’s support to Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean contribute to our common fight against terrorism. We also welcome our cooperation on military interoperability, theatre missile defence, search and rescue at sea, and civil emergency planning.
Recalling our Istanbul Summit decision, we are committed to engage our Partners in the strategically important regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia, including by strengthening liaison arrangements in these regions, and will continue dialogue with our Central Asian Partners on Afghanistan.
We also commend the work already underway to strengthen NATO Russia missile defence cooperation. We are committed to maximum transparency and reciprocal confidence building measures to allay any concerns. We encourage the Russian Federation to take advantage of United States missile defence cooperation proposals and we are ready to explore the potential for linking United States, NATO and Russian missile defence systems at an appropriate time.
We are concerned with the persistence of regional conflicts in the South Caucasus and the Republic of Moldova. Our nations support the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova. We will continue to support efforts towards a peaceful settlement of these regional conflicts, taking into account these principles.
We have noted a report “NATO’s Role in Energy Security”, prepared in response to the tasking of the Riga Summit. Allies have identified principles which will govern NATO’s approach in this field, and outlined options and recommendations for further activities. Based on these principles, NATO will engage in the following fields: information and intelligence fusion and sharing; projecting stability; advancing international and regional cooperation; supporting consequence management; and supporting the protection of critical energy infrastructure. The Alliance will continue to consult on the most immediate risks in the field of energy security. We will ensure that NATO’s endeavours add value and are fully coordinated and embedded within those of the international community, which features a number of organisations that are specialised in energy security. We have tasked the Council in Permanent Session to prepare a consolidated report on the progress achieved in the area of energy security for our consideration at the 2009 Summit.
We reaffirm the continued importance of the Black Sea region for Euro Atlantic security. In this regard, we welcome the progress in consolidation of regional ownership, through effective use of existing initiatives and mechanisms. The Alliance will continue to support, as appropriate, these efforts guided by regional priorities and based on transparency, complementarity and inclusiveness, in order to develop dialogue and cooperation among the Black Sea states and with the Alliance."
joi, 3 aprilie 2008
Uzbekistan si Turkmenistan la NATO, Rusia-NATO
dupa evenimente din Andijan 2005, Uzbekistanul in persoana presedintelui Karimov revine la sedintele Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, acum la Bucuresti, de fapt participarea lui Karimov se inscrie in politica balansarii intre Est si Vest (Rusia, China, Occident institutional), se incearca reechilibrarea vectorului Estic dezvoltat disproportionat din 2005 prin normalizarea relatiilor cu Vestul. o alta premiera reprezinta prima participare a lui Berdimuhamedov la EAPC, ceea ce rastoarna patternul izolationist promovat de Niazov. este importanta participarea in contextul eforturilor de engagement Asgabadului in proiecte energetice si introducerea noii dimensiuni pe agenda aliantei - securitatea energetica. iata si o mini analiza de RFE pe acest subiect.
cei de la GMF si Chatham House au scos papers care au fost prezentate la conferinta de la Bucuresti ce a prefatat summitul. mi-au atras atentia contributiile lui Bruce Jackson pe NATO expansion and Modern Europe, in care autorul raspunde la o serie de intrebari legate de extinderea, Balcani, Ucraina, Georgia, Rusia, US-Europe share burden; si Shepherd-Cornish o analiza detaliat pe relatia Rusia-NATO, in particular de ce se opune Rusia extinderii:"This does not mean that an expanded NATO harms Russia, per se. But it does mean that an expanded NATO harms Russia’s ability to pursue an anti-democratic agenda... If Russia is now consciously or subconsciously) defining itself as a neo-authoritarian state that wishes to see neoauthoritarianism expanded rather than diminished as a force in its “near abroad,” then NATO expansion, premised on the spread of democracy, can indeed be construed as anti-Russian. More accurately, though less elegantly, NATO is anti-anti-democracy. If Russia has chosen an anti-democratic path, it will inevitably collide at some point and at some level with a NATO that is expanding a pro-democratic alliance right in Russia’s backyard."
cei de la GMF si Chatham House au scos papers care au fost prezentate la conferinta de la Bucuresti ce a prefatat summitul. mi-au atras atentia contributiile lui Bruce Jackson pe NATO expansion and Modern Europe, in care autorul raspunde la o serie de intrebari legate de extinderea, Balcani, Ucraina, Georgia, Rusia, US-Europe share burden; si Shepherd-Cornish o analiza detaliat pe relatia Rusia-NATO, in particular de ce se opune Rusia extinderii:"This does not mean that an expanded NATO harms Russia, per se. But it does mean that an expanded NATO harms Russia’s ability to pursue an anti-democratic agenda... If Russia is now consciously or subconsciously) defining itself as a neo-authoritarian state that wishes to see neoauthoritarianism expanded rather than diminished as a force in its “near abroad,” then NATO expansion, premised on the spread of democracy, can indeed be construed as anti-Russian. More accurately, though less elegantly, NATO is anti-anti-democracy. If Russia has chosen an anti-democratic path, it will inevitably collide at some point and at some level with a NATO that is expanding a pro-democratic alliance right in Russia’s backyard."
miercuri, 2 aprilie 2008
Rusia - orientul vestic sau occidentul estic? (Lukin-Radzihovskii)
in ciuda dirijismului identitar emanat de la Kremlin, problema unei viziuni normative sustenabile nu poate fi impusa sau varsata in societate fara dezbateri, competitie politica intre forte concurente, un proces viu in care actori cu diverse obiective sunt implicati in definirea si substantierea identitatii. trei articole excelente (extrem de utile fanilor paradigmei constructiviste in TRI pt continutul sau aplicativ si mai putin teoretic) pe problema identitara rusa si problematica raportarii la SUA, conflictele inghetate si Georgia (vazuta in sondaje ca cea mai mare amenintare in spatiul CSI la adresa Rusiei) si optiunea europeana Rusiei in secolul 21. Vladimir Lukin cel care recent a scos raportul pe dr.omului in rusia fiind si ombudsmanul a publicat articol in Russia in Global Affairs, alte doua sunt de Radzihovskii (desi nu sunt absolut de acord cu autorul) le-am gasit surprinzator in Rossiskaia Gazeta.
prima ideea care strabate cele trei analize, optiunea europeana si asumarea identitatii europene nu ameninta individualitatea sau asa zisa samobitnosti Rusiei. a doua, principalele probleme si esecuri interne si externe trebuie cautate in interiorul tarii. cu greu ma abtin sa citez:""Жить назло им" - не просто ослепительная глупость, а глубокая психологическая патология, как и идея, что в наших проблемах виноваты не мы сами, а "они", "их происки". a treia patriotism cu continut agresiv si xenofob este o cale usoara dar extrem de paguboasa in constructia identitara. a patra e nevoie de un sistem politic flexibil, verticala nu este eficienta, gestionarea afacerilor in retea este modelul de preluat, modelul care permite integrarea si respinge excluderea grupurilor cu viziuni alternative (tocmai ceea ce Lavrov afirma ca aplica Rusia mai nou in politica externa).
prima ideea care strabate cele trei analize, optiunea europeana si asumarea identitatii europene nu ameninta individualitatea sau asa zisa samobitnosti Rusiei. a doua, principalele probleme si esecuri interne si externe trebuie cautate in interiorul tarii. cu greu ma abtin sa citez:""Жить назло им" - не просто ослепительная глупость, а глубокая психологическая патология, как и идея, что в наших проблемах виноваты не мы сами, а "они", "их происки". a treia patriotism cu continut agresiv si xenofob este o cale usoara dar extrem de paguboasa in constructia identitara. a patra e nevoie de un sistem politic flexibil, verticala nu este eficienta, gestionarea afacerilor in retea este modelul de preluat, modelul care permite integrarea si respinge excluderea grupurilor cu viziuni alternative (tocmai ceea ce Lavrov afirma ca aplica Rusia mai nou in politica externa).
NATO si simbolistica in RI, Ucraina-NATO-Rusia
simbolistica conteaza in relatii internationale si diplomatie deoarece face conexiuni istorice, proiecteaza viitorul si trimite semnale actorilor din sistem cu privire la actiunile si intentiile sale, iata si lantul logic 2001-2008: Bush in discursul din iunie 2001 la Varsovia anunta sanse egale pt tinere democratii de la Marea Baltica la Marea Neagra pt aderare la NATO si UE, la Praga (fost membru pactului de la Varsovia) in 2002 o noua largire NATO a fost decisa, urmatorul pas summitul NATO de la Riga (Latvia fosta republica sora in compoenta URSS) si vizita lui Bush in Georgia, acu vizita in Ucraina si summitul NATO pe alt mal anuntat in 2001 - Marea Neagra si Romania (alt ex-membru pactului de la Varsovia).
iata interviul lui Melescanu pt Vremya Novostei in legatura cu summitul NATO, pozitia Romaniei pe scutul anti-racheta, extinderea aliantei, posibilitati pt o cooperare tehnoico-militara la nivel bilateral cu Rusia (chestiunea licentelor).
si dezbaterea in stil show-off in Duma de Stat in legatura cu Ucraina si drive-ul spre NATO, apropo dezbaterea a coincis cu vizita lui Bush la Kiev. deputatii vehiculeaza ideea denuntarii tratatului de prietenie din 1997 (adica hint to Crimeea si integritatea teritoriala Ucrainei), dar nu stim cum ramane cu declaratia tripartita din ianuarie 14, 1994 Clinton-Yeltsin-Kravchuk in care rusia se subscrie sub "Reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final Act, to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of the CSCE member states and recognize that border changes can be made only by peaceful and consensual means; and reaffirm their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, and that none of their weapons will ever be used except in self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations". si in legatura cu posibila reorientare rachetelor spre Ukraina (declaratia lui Putin la ultima mega conferinta de presa), iata inca o propozitie din declaratia amintita:"Reaffirm, in the case of Ukraine, their commitment not to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT, except in the case of an attack on themselves, their territories or dependent territories, their armed forces, or their allies, by such a state in association or alliance with a nuclear weapon state."
iata interviul lui Melescanu pt Vremya Novostei in legatura cu summitul NATO, pozitia Romaniei pe scutul anti-racheta, extinderea aliantei, posibilitati pt o cooperare tehnoico-militara la nivel bilateral cu Rusia (chestiunea licentelor).
si dezbaterea in stil show-off in Duma de Stat in legatura cu Ucraina si drive-ul spre NATO, apropo dezbaterea a coincis cu vizita lui Bush la Kiev. deputatii vehiculeaza ideea denuntarii tratatului de prietenie din 1997 (adica hint to Crimeea si integritatea teritoriala Ucrainei), dar nu stim cum ramane cu declaratia tripartita din ianuarie 14, 1994 Clinton-Yeltsin-Kravchuk in care rusia se subscrie sub "Reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final Act, to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of the CSCE member states and recognize that border changes can be made only by peaceful and consensual means; and reaffirm their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, and that none of their weapons will ever be used except in self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations". si in legatura cu posibila reorientare rachetelor spre Ukraina (declaratia lui Putin la ultima mega conferinta de presa), iata inca o propozitie din declaratia amintita:"Reaffirm, in the case of Ukraine, their commitment not to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT, except in the case of an attack on themselves, their territories or dependent territories, their armed forces, or their allies, by such a state in association or alliance with a nuclear weapon state."
marți, 1 aprilie 2008
Putin-Bush, Kudrin on economy, costul North Stream
citeva detalii asupra foii de parcurs pe care o pot semna Putin Bush la Sochi documentul referindu-se la problematica scutului si strategic weapons.
discursul lui Kudrin cu privire la supraincalzirea economiei si pericolele cheltuielilor bugetare necontrolate, si raspunsul lui Nabibulina (cea care a luat locul lui Gref) si o analiza pe aceasta disputa si problemele ridicate de ministrul finantelor.
e oficial pretul North Stream a crescut, Gazpromul a dat publicitatii bugetul pt North Stream 7,4 miliarde euro (aproape 12 miliarde dolari), asta in cazul in care vor fi transate problemele rutei cu tari riverane, bugetul a crescut de 3 ori, initial se planifica ca va fi suficient doar 2,5 miliarde euro.
cei de la FIIA au scos in ultimele luni 3 briefuri bune pe Rusia: Baev si "muscular" security policy, Katri si transportation infrastructure in Russia (e bucata ei din proiectul PHD), si Vadim Kononenko si what kind of russian foreign policy beyond 2008.
discursul lui Kudrin cu privire la supraincalzirea economiei si pericolele cheltuielilor bugetare necontrolate, si raspunsul lui Nabibulina (cea care a luat locul lui Gref) si o analiza pe aceasta disputa si problemele ridicate de ministrul finantelor.
e oficial pretul North Stream a crescut, Gazpromul a dat publicitatii bugetul pt North Stream 7,4 miliarde euro (aproape 12 miliarde dolari), asta in cazul in care vor fi transate problemele rutei cu tari riverane, bugetul a crescut de 3 ori, initial se planifica ca va fi suficient doar 2,5 miliarde euro.
cei de la FIIA au scos in ultimele luni 3 briefuri bune pe Rusia: Baev si "muscular" security policy, Katri si transportation infrastructure in Russia (e bucata ei din proiectul PHD), si Vadim Kononenko si what kind of russian foreign policy beyond 2008.
NATO la Bucuresti, interviu Lavrov - diverse
intors in tara pt a urmari la fata locului cel mai important eveniment politic gazduit de Romania post-comunista. pt unii summitul va inseamna emotii pozitive, ma refer la cei care vor primi invitatii de aderarea Croatia, Albania si Macedonia (ultima sub semnul intrebarii din cauza denumirii si opozitiei Greciei care iarasi nu stiu daca in acest caz intentionat face jocul Rusiei). iata un preview de la tara-organizator (presedintele) cu privire la tematica ce va fi pusa in discutie la summitul NATO de la Bucuresti. daca sa luam de serios semnalul lui Simmons cu privire la sanse reduse ca Ucraina si Georgia sa primeasca MAP, atunci vizita lui Bush la Kiev trebuie privita mai degraba ca una de sprijin (si pe viitor pt reforme democratice si dezvoltarea economiei de piata functionale) si consolare.
interviu cu Lavrov pt Izvestia, citeva ideii:
- rusia se agata de tematica dezarmarii pt a reconfirma statutl de mare putere nucleara, Moscova doreste un tratat clasic te tip razboi rece care sa inlocuiasca START-I care va expira pe 5 decembrie 2009, SORT nu este satisfacator pt Kremlin.
- de la Kozirev la Lavrov am auzit ca rusia promoveaza o politica externa deideologizata, acum Lavrov este ceva mai sincera si spune ca rusia incearca sa promoveze o astfel de politica externa ceea ce e diferit de la a spune ca facem, alta intrebare e cat de deideologizata este aceasta?
-explicatia lui Lavrov cu privire la "criza NATO" inspirata oarecum din ideea lui Rumsfeld misiunea determina aliati si parteneri dar dusa la extrema, Sereja spune ca timpul aliantelor fixe a trecut, e timpul aliantelor flexibile nepermanente si el incadreaza acest trend in network diplomacy, adica in opinia sa aliatii de la NATO sunt depasiti si practica diplomatie din perioada razboiului rece;
- Nabucco si BTC sunt irationale din punct de vedere economic, proeicte ruse North si South Stream (care au costuri peste Nabucco si ridica probleme legate de mediu, plus si de surse) sunt cele mai avantajoase pt Europa.
interviu cu Lavrov pt Izvestia, citeva ideii:
- rusia se agata de tematica dezarmarii pt a reconfirma statutl de mare putere nucleara, Moscova doreste un tratat clasic te tip razboi rece care sa inlocuiasca START-I care va expira pe 5 decembrie 2009, SORT nu este satisfacator pt Kremlin.
- de la Kozirev la Lavrov am auzit ca rusia promoveaza o politica externa deideologizata, acum Lavrov este ceva mai sincera si spune ca rusia incearca sa promoveze o astfel de politica externa ceea ce e diferit de la a spune ca facem, alta intrebare e cat de deideologizata este aceasta?
-explicatia lui Lavrov cu privire la "criza NATO" inspirata oarecum din ideea lui Rumsfeld misiunea determina aliati si parteneri dar dusa la extrema, Sereja spune ca timpul aliantelor fixe a trecut, e timpul aliantelor flexibile nepermanente si el incadreaza acest trend in network diplomacy, adica in opinia sa aliatii de la NATO sunt depasiti si practica diplomatie din perioada razboiului rece;
- Nabucco si BTC sunt irationale din punct de vedere economic, proeicte ruse North si South Stream (care au costuri peste Nabucco si ridica probleme legate de mediu, plus si de surse) sunt cele mai avantajoase pt Europa.
Abonaţi-vă la:
Postări (Atom)
